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Synthesizing TSCA and REACH:
Practical Principles for Chemical
Regulation Reform
John S. Applegate*
The European Union's newly enacted comprehensive regulation for
industrial chemicals, known as REACH, draws heavily on three decades of
experience in the United States under the Toxic Substances Control Act. Much
of that experience has been negative-TSCA is widely regarded as a
disappointment among US. environmental laws-and so REACH deliberately
reverses many of the legislative choices that Congress made in TSCA. REACH
also takes advantage of important new regulatory devices that were not
available to the framers of TSCA thirty years ago, The passage of REACH has
sparked renewed interest in reforming TSCA, and the reformers will
undoubtedly look to REACH for ideas. This Article contends that, while many
aspects of REACH can fairly be understood as the Anti-TSCA, on closer
examination, REACH follows many of TSCA's fundamental approaches to
chemical regulation. These similarities offer a unique opportunity to develop a
synthesis of the two regulatory regimes, which could form the practical basis
for updating TSCA. While reform based on a synthesis of TSCA and REACH
would be evolutionary rather than revolutionary, it could nevertheless greatly
improve chemical regulation in the United States. The basis for such reform is
likely to remain a risk-based, chemical-based, and cost-sensitive system.
Nevertheless, a stronger commitment to progressive improvement could be
obtained by a consistent effort to eliminate the most dangerous chemicals, the
development of safety plans for the remainder, and consistent incentives to find
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safer substitutes. Chemical regulation should be more truly precautionary by
relying primarily on available information with less demand for information
that does not yet exist; regulators must be able to act in advance of full
certainty; and, in contrast to the present procedural complexity of TSCA, the
regulatory system should be simplified and include heavy reliance on providing
information to the public. The Article concludes with a brief discussion of the
global impact of national regulatory systems like REACH.
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INTRODUCTION
At the end of 2006, the European Union (EU) adopted a comprehensive
system for the regulation of industrial chemicals throughout Europe, which is
known by its acronym, REACH, for Registration, Evaluation, and
Authorization of Chemicals. The immediate impetus for REACH was to
replace the complicated and confusing system of over forty different directives
and regulations with a single (if complex) regulatory regime. However, the
European Commission ("the Commission") also saw an opportunity to develop
a regulatory program that would address substantive deficits in the existing
regulatory structure. The Commission's White Paper: Strategy for a Future
Chemicals Policy, the policy foundation for REACH, published in 2001,
focused particularly on the "data gap" for toxic chemicals, the requirement that
government prove the need for regulation, the relatively lax standards applied
to existing (as opposed to new) chemicals, and animal testing. 1
In assessing the existing regulation of chemicals, the Commission had
before it the United States' experience with the Toxic Substances Control Act
(TSCA). Enacted exactly three decades earlier, in 1976, TSCA is widely
regarded as a serious under-performer among U.S. environmental laws, despite
having itself been based on a thoughtful white paper, Toxic Substances, written
by the U.S. Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ) five years earlier 2 to
accompany the original legislative proposal. However, a highly compromised
final statutory text, hostile judicial interpretation, and often timid
implementation have undermined TSCA to the point that the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) now relies primarily on informal, voluntary measures
to regulate industrial chemicals, rather than risk the total evisceration of the
statute by the courts. With this as background, the Commission's White Paper
can be read as an extended critique of TSCA, and REACH as the legislative
product of that. critique.
1. European Comm'n, Commission White Paper: Strategy for a Future Chemicals Policy, 6,
COM (2001) 88 final (Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter Commission White Paper]. These themes are echoed in
the Commission's Explanatory Memorandum that accompanied the formal legislative proposal in 2003.
European Comm'n, Commission Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the
Council Concerning the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation, and Restriction of Chemicals
(REACH), 6-55, COM (2003) 644 final (Oct. 29, 2003) [hereinafter Commission Proposal].
2. U.S. COUNCIL ON ENVTL. QUALITY, Toxic SUBSTANCES (1971) [hereinafter US CEQ].
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TSCA and REACH are thus a matched pair-Toxic Substances and TSCA
in 1971 and 1976, respectively, and the Commission's White Paper and
REACH in 2001 and 2006, respectively-and it can be helpful to compare
them in the Hegelian framework of thesis and antithesis. 3 TSCA, the thesis,
established a comprehensive approach to chemical regulation. The failures of
the TSCA approach led to its negation in REACH, TSCA's apparent antithesis.
A synthesis, the outcome of the Hegelian dialectic, would be achieved by
reconciling the contradictions between TSCA and REACH, and recognizing in
them commonalities that serve as the basis for a new approach. The synthesis
would, ideally, be realized in the overdue reform of TSCA in the United States.
While the thesis-antithesis-synthesis structure can be overdrawn, because
TSCA and REACH do in fact share important features, the dialectic provides a
useful framing device for analyzing these important, and importantly different,
regulatory regimes for industrial chemicals. With or without TSCA reform, the
two regulatory schemes will guide the global chemical industry and regulate
chemical risks for the foreseeable future.
I. THESIS: TSCA AND ITS DISCONTENTS
A. The Congressional Response to Toxic Substances
Toxic Substances identified a wide range of problems with the then-
existing system (or lack thereof) for the control of toxic hazards of industrial
chemicals, and Congress crafted TSCA to give EPA comprehensive authority
to control these hazards. In Toxic Substances, CEQ was particularly concerned
about the gaps left by the media-based pollution statutes-gaps such as loss of
the opportunity to prevent pollution in the first place and transfer of pollution
from one media to another-and the lack of adequate information concerning
the effects of such substances. 4 The authors of Toxic Substances were
particularly concerned that the existing media-based pollution laws (mainly, air
and water) failed to account either for individuals' total exposure to chemicals
or for chemical pollution that shifts among media. Toxic Substances also
highlighted the dearth of information about the effects of those exposures, even
if they were known and regulated.5
Against this backdrop, Congress originally conceived TSCA as a far-
sighted and potentially far-reaching statute. Toxic Substances identified the lack
of adequate toxicological information and the multi-media nature of chemical
pollution as the key challenges for chemicals regulation, and Congress
3. The story of TSCA and REACH is told from a similar perspective in MARK SCHAPIRO,
EXPOSED: THE Toxic CHEMISTRY OF EVERYDAY PRODUCTS AND WHAT'S AT STAKE FOR AMERICAN
POWER 131-56 (2007).
4. US CEQ, supra note 2, at 20-22.
5. Id. at 6-14, 22.
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expressly incorporates these concerns into TSCA's preamble. 6 TSCA's orderly
structure was intended to be capable of covering all phases of chemical
production and use in order to fill gaps left by other statutes, and to offer a
range of techniques for informed chemical regulation. The adoption of these
objectives entailed several crucial legislative choices in the regulatory structure
established by TSCA.
1. Chemicals as Chemicals
Toxic Substances devoted considerable space to explaining the many
reasons to focus "on the pollutant rather than on the particular medium being
polluted," 7 and these views are repeated in the legislative history of TSCA. 8
First, regulating chemicals as such enables preventive regulation, before people
or the environment are exposed to them. Second, regulating chemicals as such
has the capacity to control them at their source, which is universally recognized
to be the most efficient and effective point of control. This is especially the
case for pollutants that persist in the environment for a long time and thus
disperse widely and even globally (DDT, for instance). Persistent chemicals
often bioaccumulate (DDT again), resulting in higher doses to affected
populations. Third, regulation of chemicals can encourage the development of a
true cradle-to-grave (production-to-disposal) management approach. Some
chemicals, like pesticides, are intentionally introduced into the environment.
They are thus a major vector for introducing new hazards to human health and
the environment, and excellent candidates for a thorough approach to risks.9
Fourth, reliance on the basic media-based pollution statutes (for air emissions,
water effluents, and land disposal10) creates a serious danger that regulated
entities will merely shift waste products between media. One might avoid land
disposal by incinerating, for example, or send water pollutants to a landfill.
While it is possible to regulate in triplicate, so to speak, it is a highly complex
undertaking because standards and techniques for one medium frequently do
not translate to another. 11 Finally, there are significant benefits to the regulated
industry in the chemical-based approach. Regulation in triplicate is a
compliance officer's nightmare, especially when regulatory programs are
delegated to the states (as the media programs are in the United States), so that
multiple versions of each are applicable to different parts of the same
enterprise.
6. Toxic Substances Control Act (TSCA) § 2, 15 U.S.C. § 2601 (2006).
7. US CEQ, supra note 2, at v-vi.
8. S. REP. No. 94-698, at 1-2 (1976).
9. Donald T. Hornstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and
Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 393-400 (1993).
10. For these purposes, the workplace might be considered a fourth separate medium, distinct
from the ambient air, water, and land environments.
11. US CEQ, supra note 2, at 20-21.
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By regulating chemicals per se, TSCA was supposed to avoid these gaps,
or fill them when they appear, as well as to regulate more efficiently and
effectively. In addition, the multi-media approach serves TSCA's preventive
goals: the "obvious limitation of controls over effluents is that they ... do not
provide for obtaining information on potential pollutants before widespread
damage has occurred. 12
2. Scope
To implement these goals, Congress's first step was to identify the
chemicals to regulate. Since the problems described in Toxic Substances were
common to essentially all industrial chemicals, the universe of TSCA's
coverage is very broad, with only limited exceptions for chemicals that are
regulated by other statutes, such as the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act
and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA). 13 In
keeping with the goal of comprehensiveness, section 6 of TSCA provides broad
regulatory authority, giving EPA the ability to control the life-cycle of
chemicals from manufacture through disposal (the latter has been rarely used,
except for PCBs, which were a special concern of the statute) and export.
TSCA also provides authority for addressing potential risks (by requiring
additional testing) and imminent hazards (by taking relatively swift action). As
to mode of regulation, EPA is authorized to regulate manufacturing processes,
warnings, concentrations, labels, uses, recordkeeping, and downstream
notification-pretty much anything that would reduce risk.
3. Prevention
CEQ intended TSCA's fundamental attribute to be prevention. CEQ was
explicit that the chemical regulation system should not merely respond to
harms that had already occurred:
Our awareness of environmental threats, our ability to screen and test
substances for adverse effects, and our capabilities for monitoring and
predicting, although inadequate, are now sufficiently developed that we
need no longer remain in a purely reactive posture with respect to chemical
hazards. We need no longer be limited to repairing damage after it has been
done; nor should we allow the general population to be used as a laboratory
for discovering adverse health effects. 14
To accomplish the shift to a preventative regulatory scheme, Toxic Substances
advocated a system of substantive standards to be met by new chemicals, 15
12. Id. at 20.
13. See Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, 21 U.S.C. 301-309 (2006); Federal Insecticide, Fungicide,
and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), 7 U.S.C. 13 6 -1 3 6 y (2006).
14. Id. at 21.
15. Id. at 22.
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implicitly through some kind of licensing mechanism of the kind that exists for
prescription drugs and pesticides.
The emphasis on prevention-based regulation in Toxi-. Substances stands
in contrast to the failure of the tort system to prevent the harmful effects of
toxic chemicals. The tort system only responds to harms that have already
occurred and does not prohibit harm-causing activities; rather, it seeks to
remedy past harms with money damages. As a compensatory system, this
approach is flawed because much harm (death, dismemberment, pain) cannot
be fully rectified by payment, and the failure to forbid the infliction of physical
harm in advance violates a sense of human dignity and autonomy. More
importantly, from a regulatory point of view, tort law is also supposed to act as
a deterrent to future harm-causing activity, because subsequent risk-creators
will realize that they will have to pay for the harm they cause. However, risk-
creators will refrain from certain activities only to the extent that the cost of
preventing the harm is less than the cost of the harm. 16 That is, the level of
protection is set by the individual tortfeasors' assessment of the comparative
costs of prevention and liability, rather than by a collective public judgment of
an acceptable level of harm. TSCA's adoption of a system based on risk rather
than harm represent such a collective judgment. 17
Congress sought to create the kind of preventative scheme in TSCA that
was advocated in Toxic Substances by creating requirements of manufacturers
to be met before a chemical is brought to market The Senate drafting
committee reported,
The most effective and efficient time to prevent unreasonable risks to
public health or the environment is prior to first manufacture. It is at this
point that the costs of regulation in terms of human suffering, jobs lost,
wasted capital expenditures, and other costs are lowest. Frequently, it is far
more painful to take regulatory action after all of these costs have been
incurred. 18
In furtherance of this objective, TSCA includes the pre-manufacture notice
(PMN) procedure, which requires a chemical manufacturer to notify EPA of its
intention to offer a new chemical for sale for stated purposes and to provide
identity and risk information in its possession at the time. 19 EPA is given a
limited time to object before the new substance (or significant new use of an
existing substance) is released to the market and the environment. While this is
16. This assumes that the tort system accurately assesses the costs. For toxic substances, where
causation is often very difficult to prove because of the nature of toxic injury, the tort system can be
expected to understate the costs. Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic
Products, 82 CORNELL L. REv. 773, 774-76, 784-85 (1997) [hereinafter Choosing Ignorance).
17. See GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS: A LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 95-
107 (1970).
18. S. REP. No. 94-698, at 5 (1976).
19. TSCA § 5, 15 U.S.C. § 2604 (2006).
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more a procedural than a substantive hurdle for new chemicals-as discussed
later-it clearly reflects the preventive goal of Toxic Substances.
4. Probabilistic Risk
Congress had choices among regulatory mechanisms for implementing
TSCA's preventive goal. 20 One strategy would have been to simply classify
chemicals as hazardous and ban them, or as safe and allow their sale. A
prominent example of this approach can be found in the 1958 Delaney Clause
in the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, which simply bans as additives in
foods or drugs any substance that "is found to induce cancer when ingested by
man or animal. '2 1 The restrictions of the Delaney Clause are based solely on
the carcinogenic property of the chemical; the chemical's potency and the
degree of exposure are irrelevant to the statutory analysis. It relies on a simple,
bi-modal (safe-unsafe) proposition: if the chemical is a carcinogen, then it must
be banned. Alternatively, risk can be understood as a probability or a matter of
degree. This alternative, probability-of-harm approach conceives of risk as the
product of the severity of the hazard to be avoided and the likelihood or
probability of harm.
The full implications of the bi-modal Delaney Clause strategy may not
have been fully appreciated when it was enacted, and regulators and
commentators soon began to distinguish between risk in the sense of hazard,
which is the simple existence of danger and as such either exists or does not,
and risk in the sense of probability, which creates a spectrum of likelihood from
zero (impossible): to one hundred percent (certainty).2 2 Probability allowed
subsequent regulatory regimes to avoid the all-or-nothing consequences of the
Delaney Clause approach. Instead, more recent systems tend to view chemical
hazards as incrementally scalable based on their toxic potency and the amount
of exposure to the chemical. This is especially useful when one is focusing on a
chemical hazard like cancer, which generally does not have a step-wise
progression of doses with distinctive effects, but rather presents a scaled
likelihood of occurrence.
In TSCA, Congress plainly chose the probabilistic meaning of risk, 23 and
it did not reject all risk, but only unreasonable risk.24 The "unreasonable risk"
20. See John S. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap: Balancing the Supply and Demand for
Chemical Information, 86 TEX. L. REV. 1365, 1366-77 (2008) [hereinafter Bridging the Data Gap];
John S. Applegate, Introduction: Environmental Risk: Defining the Problem and Disciplining the
Response, in THE INTERNATIONAL LIBRARY OF ESSAYS IN ENVIRONMENTAL LAW: ENVIRONMENTAL
RISK xiv-xix (Ashgate ed., 2004) [hereinafter Introduction]; Elizabeth Fisher, Risk and Environmental
Law: A Beginner's Guide, in ENVIRONMENTAL LAW FOR SUSTAINABILITY 97-125 (Benjamin J.
Richardson & Stepan Wood eds., 2006) (for descriptions of the rise of risk-based regulation).
21. Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetics Act § 409, 21 U.S.C. § 348 (c)(3)(A) (1958).
22. See Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap, supra note 20, at 1366-67.
23. H.R. REP.NO. 94-1341,at 14(1976).
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standard in section 6 (containing TSCA's basic regulatory authorities) is the
touchstone of TSCA's substantive provisions, and virtually all of TSCA's
regulatory provisions, such as testing requirements and imminent hazards, are
variations on that theme.25 Probabilistic risk serves TSCA's objectives well in
several respects. Risk, of course, denotes the potential for harm, and it supports
a regulatory system where the goal is avoidance of harm to human health and
the environment, rather than after-the-fact compensation. 26 Risk permits
preventive action. "Unreasonable risk" is undefined in the statute, but the
legislative history and subsequent judicial interpretation consistently interpret it
as a greater-than-zero level that is determined by reference to health, benefits,
and costs. Further, the probabilistic meaning of risk meshes well with the
scalable regulatory authority given to EPA in TSCA. More serious risks can be
addressed with more severe restrictions, and protection from particular kinds of
risks can be accomplished with targeted regulatory responses.
5. Information and Filling the Data Gap
Probabilistic risk-based regulation must, almost by definition, be science-
based regulation. The whole enterprise of determining a level of risk demands a
high degree of scientific knowledge because the relevant probabilities can only
be ascertained through detailed understanding of the toxic properties of
chemicals and their degree of exposure to humans and the environment. If the
goal is to quantify the risk 2 7-which is the logical consequence of thinking
about probabilities-the data needs are intensified. 28 CEQ's report was
prescient in identifying lack of information about chemicals as a major
challenge for effective chemical regulation,29 and Congress was persuaded.30
Whether or not Congress fully foresaw a science-based, information-intensive
regulatory regime, its repeated calls for more data strongly suggest it did.
In deciding on this approach, Congress consciously drafted TSCA to push
manufacturers and the EPA to fill the "data gap" identified in Toxic Substances.
24. Id. at 15. See also John S. Applegate, The Perils of Unreasonable Risk: Information,
Regulatory Policy, and Toxic Substances Control, 91 COLUM. L. REv. 261, 273-277 (1994) [hereinafter
Perils].
25. For example, the basic regulatory actions are authorized for chemicals that "present an
unreasonable risk," TSCA § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006), information may be required about chemicals
that "may present an unreasonable risk," § 4, and urgent action may be taken against an "imminent and
unreasonable risk, § 7(f).
26. See H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, at 1-4 (1976); ROBERT A. SHAPIRO & ROBERT L. GLICKSMAN,
RISK REGULATIONS AT RISK: RESTORING A PRAGMATIC APPROACH 1-2 (2003). See generally
Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap, supra note 20.
27. Moreover, quantification of risk became a de facto goal in all toxics areas after the "Benzene"
case in the U.S. Supreme Court. See Indus. Union Dep't v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607 (1980).
28. See Applegate, Perils, supra note 24, at 285.
29. US CEQ, supra note 2, at iv, 9-10.
30. "This vast volume of chemicals have, for the most part, been released into the environment




The substantively demanding and procedurally complex provisions of TSCA
require substantial information for making regulatory decisions. A regulatory
scheme that took a less nuanced approach to risk or mandated safeguards across
the board would have allowed EPA to act, even in the absence of information
on the effects of particular chemicals. For example, technology-based
standards-already familiar from the Clean Water Act 3 1-would have
demanded relatively little chemical information, while risk-based standards
tend to require a great deal. Risk-based TSCA requires EPA to consider a wide
array of information, including alternatives, and it backs this up by requiring
specific findings and permitting aggressive judicial review.32
Another of Congress' "basic policy objectives" in TSCA was to place the
responsibility for generating this information on manufacturers: 33
It is the policy of the United States that . . . adequate data should be
developed with respect to the effect of chemical substances and mixtures
on health and the environment and that the development of such data
should be the responsibility of those who manufacture and those who
process such chemical substances and mixtures .... 34
It includes a menu of data-gathering provisions to effectuate this goal. While
EPA is authorized to conduct its own research,35 most of the data-gathering
techniques envision production of the information by the regulated entities.
New chemicals, in particular, are subject to pre-manufacture notification, which
gives EPA an opportunity to examine existing data on new chemicals or new
uses of existing chemicals and to object if it finds an unreasonable risk or
believes that additional data are needed. 36 For existing chemicals, a wider range
of techniques was provided: "test rules" that require manufacturers to generate
risk data; significant new use rules (SNURs) that trigger a further PMN process
for existing chemicals; data on manufacturing and processing; updates of the
Inventory of Chemical Substances; and the reporting of adverse health effects,
published and unpublished health and safety studies, and "substantial risks." 37
6. Support for the Chemical Industry
The choice of "unreasonable risk" as a standard implicitly requires the
balancing of many considerations to determine what constitutes
"unreasonable." In part, this stems from the scalable (as opposed to bi-modal)
31. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Triumph of Technology-Based Standards, 2000 U. ILL. L. REV.
83, 88-107 (2000).
32. See Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap, supra note 20, at 1386-86; John S. Applegate &
Robert Fischman, Missing Information: The Scientific Data Gap in Conservation and Chemical
Regulation, Forward 83 IND. L.J. 399, 402-04 (2008).
33. S. REp. NO. 94-698, at 17 (1976).
34. TSCA § 2(b)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2601(b)(1) (2006).
35. Id. § 10.
36. Id. § 5.
37. Id. §§ 4, 5, 8.
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nature of the probabilistic approach to risk adopted by TSCA. It also stems
from a desire to protect, if not promote, useful economic activity. While the
authors of Toxic Substances focused on health and environmental effects,
Congress was also concemed about the impact of regulation on the important
U.S. chemical industry:
It is the intent of Congress that the Administrator shall carry out this
chapter in a reasonable and prudent manner, and that the Administrator
shall consider the environmental, economic, and social impact of any action
the Administrator takes or proposes to take under this chapter. 38
The central substantive standard for chemicals regulation-unreasonable risk-
furthers these dual objectives. While Congress expressly declined to define
"unreasonable" in quantitative (risk levels or cost-benefit ratio) or comparative
terms, it did make clear that "unreasonable" was to be determined by a range of
factors, including direct and indirect costs:
In general, a determination that a risk associated with a chemical substance
or mixture is unreasonable involves balancing the probability that harm will
occur and the magnitude and severity of that harm against the effect of
proposed regulatory action on the availability to society of the benefits of
the substance or mixture, taking into account the availability of substitutes
for the substance or mixture which do not require regulation, and other
adverse effects which such proposed action may have on society. 39
Congress, in other words, attempted to strike a balance between protective
regulation and protecting an important segment of the U.S. economy. This is
not an irrational or unexpected approach, but it has important consequences for
the substantive and procedural burdens that the chemical industry was expected
to bear.
7. New and Existing Chemicals
In crafting TSCA, Congress also faced the decision whether to distinguish
between established uses and novel products entering the market. The old-new
distinction is a long-standing conundrum in environmental regulation, because
new regulatory regimes are almost always grafted onto existing technologies. It
is generally cheaper to regulate only new entrants, since they can more readily
38. Id. § 2(c). In addition, section 2(b)(3) states that "authority over chemical substances and
mixtures should be exercised in such a manner as not to impede unduly or create unnecessary economic
barriers to technological innovation while fulfilling the primary purpose of this Act to assure that such
innovation and commerce in such chemical substances and mixtures do not present an unreasonable risk
of injury to health or the environment."
39. H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, at 13-14 (1976); see also S. REP. No. 94-698, at 13 (1976). The statute
reads: "In promulgating any rule ... with respect to a chemical substance or mixture, the Administrator
shall consider and publish a statement with respect to . . . the reasonably ascertainable economic
consequences of the rule, after consideration of the effect on the national economy, small business,




conform to new standards. 40 This also reduces political opposition because it
leaves existing investments largely untouched.41 Furthermore, regulatory
agencies with limited resources may have an easier task in regulating a smaller
segment of the market. On the other hand, making such distinctions also has
substantial drawbacks. The approach leaves a large segment of the relevant
industry minimally regulated beyond the threat of products liability, which has
well known limitations in its application to toxic substances.42 The old-new
distinction also inhibits desirable innovation by encouraging the continued use
of the old, more dangerous technologies that are subject to less regulatory
scrutiny.
In drafting TSCA, Congress chose to regulate new chemicals substantially
more strictly than existing ones. TSCA's screening process applies only to new
chemicals (or significant new uses of existing ones). While the PMN process is
not robust, as discussed in the next part, it is at least a gesture toward gathering
safety information about new chemicals, and it establishes the only point at
which the agency is required to focus on particular chemicals. There is no
mandatory look-back provision for existing chemicals, even though existing
chemicals represent over 99 percent by volume of chemicals in commerce. 43
While TSCA does include several provisions for gathering information on
existing chemicals, the provisions have proven to be of limited force. For
example, the test rules in section 4 of TSCA are supposed to be triggered by a
priority list created by the Interagency Testing Committee, but procedural and
judicial hurdles have discouraged the promulgation of rules.44 Similarly,
section 8 requires reporting of studies and incidents to EPA, but the reporting is
inconsistent and there is no requirement that EPA take action on the reports. In
short, if TSCA's action-forcing is weak for new chemicals, it is virtually non-
existent for existing ones.
8. Synoptic Approach
It is ironic that TSCA has been an under-achiever among the toxics
statutes because it has a carefully conceived, comprehensive, and integrated
structure that was developed in response to a coherent plan to respond to the
particular problems of toxic chemicals. Taken as a whole, TSCA methodically
covers nearly all aspects of chemical manufacture, use, and disposal-the
40. For example, the Clean Air Act establishes new source performance standards (NSPS) which
are significantly more stringent standards than the standards for existing sources. 42 U.S.C. § 7411
(2006).
41. See generally Peter Huber, The Old-New Division in Risk Regulation, 69 VA. L. REv. 1025
(1983).
42. See Wagner, Choosing Ignorance, supra note 16, at 774-76, 784-85.
43. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 6.
44. The PMN standard for preventing sale of new chemicals pending additional information in
TSCA section 5(e) is very similar to the standard for obtaining information on existing chemicals in
section 4(a).
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identification of subjects of regulation (the Chemical Substances Inventory45),
information generation techniques for new and old chemicals, a wide range of
regulatory control options, and the coordination of regulatory action across
media and across statutes-and the whole edifice is neatly tied to a single
substantive regulatory standard, "unreasonable risk," or variations thereon.
Moreover, TSCA employs a "synoptic" approach, to use Professor
Hornstein's term for regulation that seeks to address all aspects of an identified
problem.46 The elements to be considered in taking regulatory action-human
health and environmental effects, economic impact, social impact, and so on-
are for all practical purposes unlimited. 47 Since chemicals are, after all, useful
products (as opposed to pollutants), TSCA's risk-cost-benefit balancing seems
appropriate, if not inevitable, for addressing the problem of regulating
industrial chemicals. TSCA also requires some kind of comparative assessment
of regulatory alternatives, since EPA has to choose the "least burdensome"
alternative 48 and to defer to other statutes when they are effective. 49 TSCA's
synopticism lends further support to the dual goals of protecting health and
protecting the chemical industry, by enforcing a role for the statute that is
limited in stringency (unreasonable risk, least burdensome regulations) and in
scope (statutory gap-filling). It also commits the agency to a fairly exhaustive
investigation and analysis each time it seeks to exert regulatory control.
9. Procedural Complexity
A final consequence of the attempt to balance regulation and support of
the chemical industry and to regulate new and old chemicals under a synoptic
approach is that TSCA is procedurally complex. The procedures for rulemaking
under the main regulatory authorities (section 6), the mechanics of deploying
the PMN process to obtain additional data, and test rules are all predicated on
specific findings by EPA. Hybrid rulemaking procedures (that is, procedures in
addition to the basic notice-and-comment procedures of informal rulemaking)
apply to most of EPA's actions under TSCA. And the judicial review provision
is notable for adopting the "substantial evidence" standard of judicial review.
This apparently procedural standard highlights the predicate findings by
requiring specific justification for each. Moreover, the "substantial evidence"
45. TSCA § 8(b), 15 U.S.C. § 2607(b) (2006). The Inventory is the basis for distinguishing
between new and existing chemicals and uses. REACH relies on a similar device, the European
Inventory of Existing Commercial Chemical Substances. European Commission Regulation 1907/2006,
art. 3(20), Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals, 2006 O.J. (L 396) 1
(EC) [hearinafter REACH] (defining "phase-in substance").
46. Donald T. Homstein, Lessons from Federal Pesticide Regulation on the Paradigms and
Politics of Environmental Law Reform, 10 YALE J. ON REG. 369, 386-87 (1993).
47. By contrast, the Clean Air Act has been repeatedly construed to exclude cost consideration.
See Whitman v. American Trucking Ass'n, 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
48. TSCA § 6(a).
49. Id. § 9(a).
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standard signals Congress' wish that EPA's actions under the statute be
subjected to a more skeptical approach from reviewing courts.
B. TSCA "s Disappointments
TSCA has not been the comprehensive and aggressive regulator of
industrial chemicals that was recommended by CEQ, feared by industry, and
predicted by both. Rather, its actual performance reflects the legislative
compromises that were necessary to enact it. Many of the critical mechanisms
in TSCA have not functioned or have been abandoned in practice. The goals of
collecting data on potentially hazardous chemicals and of regulating them have
not been met. These failings result from a range of obstacles, not least of which
are the structural choices made in crafting TSCA.
1. Information Gathering
One of the main shortcomings of TSCA is the slow pace of the generation
of new data on chemical hazards. It has been well documented that a severe
data gap still exists for industrial chemicals. 50 EPA and the European
Commission (the latter in anticipation of REACH) undertook several studies of
chemical information in the last decade, and they have uniformly reached the
conclusion that basic chemical data--even for high production volume (HPV)
chemicals-is only minimally available. The 1984 Toxicity Testing study by
the National Academy of Sciences found in its sample that no toxicity testing
was available for more than 80 percent of all toxic substances in commerce and
that even a minimum data set was available for only 22 percent of HPV
chemicals. 51 More than a decade later, the Environmental Defense Fund (now
Environmental Defense) published a report which found that a screening data
set (that is, far less than would be needed to complete a risk assessment) was
publicly available for only 29 percent of the one hundred HPV chemicals
(greater than one million lbs/year) in their sample. 52 No data or only part of the
screening data set was publicly available for 71 percent of the sample.53 The
Chemical Manufacturers Association (CMA, now American Chemistry
Council) responded with its own study, with results that are not all that
dissimilar. 54 CMA found that a complete screening data set existed for 7
percent of chemicals, though others have interpreted the findings less
50. See Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap, supra note 20 at 1381-83.
51. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL (NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES), TOxICITY TESTING IN
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY: A VISION AND A STRATEGY 205-08 (2007).
52. ENVIRONMENTAL DEFENSE FUND, Toxic IGNORANCE: THE CONTINUING ABSENCE OF BASIC
HEALTH TESTING FOR TOP-SELLING CHEMICALS IN THE UNITED STATES 15 (1997), available at
http://www.environmentaldefense.org/documents/243_toxicignorance.pdf.
53. Id.
54. David Roe, Toxic Chemical Control Policy: Three Unabsorbed Facts, 32 ENVTL. L. REP.
10,232, 10,237 (2002).
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generously. 55 EPA undertook a third study of HPV chemicals and found that
"no basic toxicity information ... is publicly available for 43 percent of the
high volume chemicals manufactured in the U.S. and that a full set of basic
toxicity information is available for only 7 percent of these chemicals." 56
In preparing for REACH, the European Commission sponsored several
additional studies of chemical data. One study concluded that a publicly
available screening base data set existed for only 14 percent of the HPV
chemicals studied, less than a base set existed for 65 percent, and no data
existed for 21 percent. 57 Other European studies have reached conclusions
similar to EPA's.58 These studies paint a remarkably consistent picture of the
lack of data (at least publicly available data; the existence of private data
cannot be verified) concerning HPV chemicals, the chemicals that one would
expect to support the greatest amount of risk research.
These weaknesses flow from the approach and compromises Congress
made in enacting TSCA. While the Senate report spoke of the need to "assure
that chemicals receive careful premarket scrutiny," 59 Congress did not
ultimately follow the licensing model of food and drug and pesticides laws.
Enacting TSCA after several failed attempts, it instead adopted the much
weaker PMN procedure. PMN does not require the creation of any new safety
data; EPA must take what it is given. If EPA wants more information, then it
must take the initiative and assume the burden of proving the need for that
information when it seeks to restrict a new chemical or new use. 60 EPA's
55. Id.
56. U.S ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, OFFICE OF POLLUTION PREVENTION AND Toxics. CHEMICAL
HAZARD DATA AVAILABILITY STUDY: WHAT Do WE REALLY KNOW ABOUT THE SAFETY OF HIGH
PRODUCTION VOLUME CHEMICALS? 2 (1998), available at http://www.epa.gov/HPV/pubs/generalU
hazchem.pdf.
57. EUROPEAN COMM'N JOINT RESEARCH CTR., INST. FOR HEALTH & CONSUMER PROT.,
EUROPEAN CHEM. BUREAU, PUBLIC AVAILABILITY OF DATA ON EU HIGH PRODUCTION VOLUME
CHEMICALS 1, EUR 18996 EN (1999), available at http://ecb.jrc.it/DOCUMENTS/Existing-
Chemicals/PUBLICAVAILABILITY OFDATA/datavail.pdf.
58. EUROPEAN COMM'N JOINT RESEARCH CTR., INST. FOR HEALTH & CONSUMER PROT.,
ASSESSMENT OF ADDITIONAL TESTING NEEDS UNDER REACH: EFFECTS OF (Q)SARS, RISK BASED
TESTING AND VOLUNTARY INDUSTRY INITIATIVES (2003), available at http://ecb.jrc.it/documents/
REACH/PUBLICATIONS/REACH testingneeds final.pdf [hereinafter ASSESSMENT OF ADDITIONAL
TESTING NEEDS]; see also RPA & STATISTICS SWEDEN, ASSESSMENT OF THE BUSINESS IMPACT OF NEW
REGULATIONS IN THE CHEMICALS SECTOR 11-14, 27-28 (2002), available at
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enterprise/reach/docs/whitepaper/bia-summary-2002-06.pdf; COMM'N OF
THE EUROPEAN COMMUNITIES, COMM'N STAFF WORKING PAPER, REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN
PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL CONCERNING THE REGISTRATION, EVALUATION, AUTHORISATION
AND RESTRICTIONS OF CHEMICALS (REACH), ESTABLISHING A EUROPEAN CHEMICALS AGENCY AND
AMENDING DIRECTIVE 1999/45/EC AND REGULATION (EC) (ON PERSISTENT ORGANIC POLLUTANTS),
EXTENDED IMPACT ASSESSMENT 26-27 (2003) 644 final, available at http://europa.eu.int/comm/
enterprise/reach/docs/reach/eia-sec-2003_ 171 .pdf.
59. S. REP. NO. 94-698, at 3 (1976).
60. TSCA § 5(f), 15 U.S.C. § 2604(f) (2006). Indeed, reading the fine print, it is ultimately the
courts who decide whether there should be a delay in the distribution or sale of a new chemical or new
use of an existing one. See id. § 5 (e)(1)-(2).
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experience under PMIN has been pretty much what one would expect from this
structure. In sharp contrast to the expectations of "careful premarket scrutiny,"
EPA's own website acknowledges that, "[b]ecause many PMNs include little or
no toxicity or fate data, the program uses several risk screening approaches to
facilitate assessment in the absence of specific data." 6 1
The weak PMN screening mechanism receives little support from the
systems for gathering information about existing chemicals, which constitute
the vast majority of chemicals in commerce. 62 In principle, EPA has the
authority to require manufacturers to submit a variety of environmental and
health effects data under section 8 of TSCA, but it encounters several
procedural and definitional barriers in the statute itself, and EPA has not been
particularly aggressive in addressing these barriers. For example, both
Congress and EPA define "substantial risk" in a way that leaves reporting
largely to the manufacturer's own judgment.63 The Government Accountability
Office (GAO) concluded that "EPA does not routinely assess existing
chemicals, has limited information on their health and environmental risks, and
has issued few regulations controlling such chemicals." 64
2. Burden of Proof
Not only does EPA not receive adequate data, but the agency's ability
actually to act on those data is both procedurally and legally difficult. In
particular, TSCA's placement of the burden of proof makes regulation difficult.
A demanding screening of chemicals depends critically on allocating the
burden of demonstrating safety to the applicant (typically, the manufacturer),
which creates a strong incentive for the applicant to come forward with
required information to obtain a license to sell the product. 65 TSCA's PMN
neither allocates the burden to the applicant nor requires any minimum level of
toxicity information-with predictably disappointing results. Instead, the
burden of demonstrating unsafety is allocated to EPA. The effect of this
61. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Pollution Prevention & Toxics,
http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/ar/2007-2008/reviewnewchem/index.htm (last visited October 13, 2008);
see also RICHARD A. DENISON, NOT THAT INNOCENT: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF CANADIAN,
EUROPEAN UNION AND UNITED STATES POLICIES ON INDUSTRIAL CHEMICALS IV-1 (2007), available at
http://www.edf.org/article.cfm?contentid=6147.
62. DENISON, supra note 61, at IV-l 1-16.
63. See TSCA Section 8(e), Notification of Substantial Risk, Policy Clarification and Reporting
Guidance, 68 Fed. Reg. 33129, 33138 (June 3, 2003). By contrast, EPA's own regulations under the
pesticide statute, FIFRA, is very precise and leaves far less discretion. See 40 C.F.R. § 159.158(a) & part
159 generally.
64. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, CHEMICAL REGULATIONS: OPTIONS EXIST TO
IMPROVE EPA's ABILITY TO ASSESS HEALTH RISKS AND MANAGE ITS CHEMICALS REVIEW PROGRAM,
GAO-05-458, 12, 18-27 (2005). See also DENISON, supra note 61, at IV-12-16.
65. The effectiveness of this technique was nicely demonstrated, albeit incidentally, by the 1984
National Academy of Sciences' study of chemical data. It found a large data gap in all regulatory areas,
but the gap was strikingly smaller in food and drug and pesticides regulation, where a licensing scheme
placed the burden of proof on the applicant. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 51, at 205-208.
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allocation is intensified by additional requirements that EPA make certain
specific findings on toxicity, the adequacy of other federal laws, and alternative
regulatory approaches. 66 As if that were not enough, EPA must also support its
findings with "substantial evidence" on judicial review.67 The legislative
history expressly states that Congress "intend[ed] that the reviewing court
engage in a searching review of the Administrator's reasons and explanations
for the Administrator's conclusions." 6 8 Under these constraints, EPA has never
taken a great deal of mandatory action under TSCA.69
Furthermore, mandatory restrictions came to a complete halt after the
Corrosion Proof Fittings case in 1991. The Fifth Circuit (which happens to be
located in the heartland of chemical manufacturing) ruled that EPA's decade-
long effort to restrict asbestos (yes, asbestos) products was insufficiently
supported by the record and by EPA's analysis. The court found that TSCA's
"least burdensome" language created a principle that the more stringent the
regulation, the greater the degree of proof to justify regulation is required.70
Within this already challenging structure, the court criticized "the manner in
which the EPA conducted some of its analysis," "some of the methodology
employed by the EPA in making various of the calculations that it did
perform," the extent of reliance on "unquantified benefits," and the degree of
reliance on population exposure.7 1 The court was unquestionably exploiting
elements that were available in the statute (the expectation of searching review,
for instance), but its aggressive interpretation of those elements and attitude of
extreme skepticism toward EPA's evidence have brought the mandatory
program to a standstill.72 TSCA's most recent annual reports show very little
activity that does not consist of voluntary programs. 73
3. Procedural Hurdles
The procedural complexity of TSCA creates a range of barriers to
regulation as well. The barriers exist, as noted above, for the basic substantive
control authorities, for pre-market notification, and for post-market test rules.
The test rule provision, for example, gives EPA the authority to require
manufacturers to test existing chemicals, but in order to do so EPA must first
make several formal findings which are subject to judicial review under the
66. TSCA § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 2605 (2006).
67. Id. § 19(b).
68. H.R. REP., No. 94-1341, at 55-56 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1679, at 96 (1976); see also S.
REP. No. 94-698, at 28 (1976).
69. U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 64, at 27-29.
70. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1220 (5th Cir. 1991).
71. Id. at 1216-1219.
72. Under TSCA's judicial review provisions, the challenger of a regulation can bring suit on its
home turf. TSCA § 19(a)(1)(A). This makes it very difficult for EPA to obtain review in other courts,
and it has made the Fifth Circuit, covering Texas and Louisiana, the de facto national court for TSCA.
73. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Pollution Prevention & Toxics, supra note 61.
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demanding "substantial evidence" standard.74 The requirement that EPA
demonstrate that the chemical "may present an unreasonable risk," and thus
needs additional information to make a decision about regulation, creates a
regulatory Catch-22: EPA must have chemical information in order to prove
that it needs it, but it needs the information because it does not have it.75 As a
result, EPA has required testing of fewer than two hundred out of thousands of
existing chemicals,76 and of those two hundred, one hundred and forty were
imposed by rule and sixty by consent.77 EPA's current website finds it
necessary to "redefine success" under its chemical testing program by including
voluntary approaches in its totals.78
Here we see the effects of congressional choices in the creation of TSCA.
EPA's procedural burden in TSCA is no accident, and it reflects two important
legislative compromises. First, when addressing complex and technically
arcane subjects, Congress inevitably delegates relatively broad powers to
administrative agencies, because it can only provide limited substantive
constraints. Therefore, Congress also imposes procedural devices to ensure its
ability to exercise continuing oversight or indirect control to keep the agency's
actions in line with the original legislative bargain.79 Thus, the procedural
barriers in TSCA reflect an intentional effort to limit the scope of the eventual
regulation of toxic chemicals. Second, the original drafters of TSCA clearly
recognized the asymmetry between the government and the regulated industry
with respect to chemical information, which is exactly why they emphasized
the need to generate data and located responsibility for doing so with industry.
However, the final text reflects a compromise between the asserted goal of
industry responsibility and economic protection of that industry. 80 The central
mechanisms of that compromise are the allocation of the burden of proof to
EPA and the legislatively-mandated procedures EPA is required to follow
before undertaking virtually any agency action under TSCA. Professors
McCubbins, Noll, and Weingast observed,
74. The more flexible "arbitrary, capricious" standard, which is typical for decisions of this kind,
was provided in the original Senate bill, S. REP. No. 94-698, at 28 (1976). Review was made more
rigorous in the negotiations with the House version of the bill, H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, at 17-18 (1976);
see also H.R. REP. No. 94-1679, at 61 (1976).
75. Applegate, Perils, supra note 24, at 315-30.
76. The TSCA Inventory contains about sixty-two thousand chemical substances, but the majority
are of limited regulatory significance. James W. Conrad, Jr., Open Secrets: The Widespread Availability
of Information About the Health and Environmental Effects of Chemicals, 69 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
141,143-45(2006).
77. RICHARD A. DENISON, HIGH HOPES, Low MARKS: A FINAL REPORT CARD ON THE HPV
CHEMICAL CHALLENGE 6 & n. 3 (2007), available at http://www.edf.org/documents/6653_
HighHopesLowMarks.pdf; U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 64, at 18.
78. EPA, Office of Pollution Prevention & Toxics, supra note 61.
79. Lisa S. Bressman, Procedures as Politics in Administration Law, 107 COLUM. L. REV. 1749,
1752-53, 1768-71(2007).
80. Wendy Wagner, When All Else Fails: Regulating Risky Products Through Tort Litigation, 95
GEO. L.J. 693, 697 (2007).
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Because policy decisions depend on what information is available to the
agency, structure and process determine the quantity, quality, and
completeness of available information and the extent to which policy
decisions must be supported by this information. Political principals can
control the influence of a constituency by using structure and process to
affect the dependence of the agency on information the constituency
supplies . . . More elaborate procedures are generally regarded as
favorable to regulated industries. Because industries possess much of the
information relevant to regulatory decisions, elaborate processes give them
more power by increasing the importance of that information. 8 1
The authors, in fact, offer TSCA's rejection of strong pre-market screening as
an example of strategic procedural complexity. 8
2
As one would expect, the greatest number of substantive and procedural
requirements apply to the imposition of actual restrictions. Not only are several
specific findings demanded, but EPA must go through an elaborate hearing
process (designated "informal;" in fact, anything but), including oral testimony
and even cross-examination. And, in case the point was not clear enough, these
procedures are specially called out for enforcement in the judicial review
section,83 ensuring that EPA will always go though the entire panoply of
potential procedures to avoid reversal after investing in a lengthy administrative
process, as happened in Corrosion Proof Fittings.
4. Voluntary Measures
While the formal procedures of regulation have failed, an informal
practice of consent orders for further testing has developed, 84 which industry
and EPA regard as quite satisfactory for obtaining necessary data. Chemicals
are screened for their structural similarities to chemicals with known hazards,
and requests for additional information are made accordingly. 85 In addition,
voluntary control actions are sometimes taken.8 6 Nevertheless, the GAO
reported in 2005 that only about 20 percent of new chemicals receive detailed
81. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics,
and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,
440-41,469 (1989).
82. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Procedures as
Instruments of Political Control, 3 J. L. ECON. & ORG. 243,268-69 (1987).
83. TSCA § 19(c)(l)(B)(ii), 15 U.S.C § 2618(c)(1)(B)(ii) (2006).
84. DENISON, supra note 77, at 6; see also EPA, Office of Pollution Prevention & Toxics, TSCA
Chemical Testing Program Objectives, http://epa.gov/opptintr/chemtest/pubs/vision.htm (last visited
October 16, 2008); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Section 8 of TSCA, http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/tsca8e
(last visited Oct 16, 2008); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, TSCA Section 5 New Chemicals Program,
http://www.epa.gov/opptintr/newchems (last visited October 16, 2008); U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Chemical Information Collection and Data Development (Testing), http://www.epa.gov.opptintr/
chemtest/index.htm (last visited October 16, 2008).
85. Janey Cohen, EU, Canada on "Leading Edge" of Paradigm Shift on Chemical Regulation, 30
INTL. ENVT. REP. (BNA) 779 (Oct. 3, 2007); Conrad, supra note 76, at 143-144.
86. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 66, at 16-17.
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review. 87 While simply counting chemicals and tests may be an imperfect
measure, it is suggestive, and the GAO concluded that "EPA lacks sufficient
data to ensure that potential health and environmental risks of new chemicals
are identified.
88
In principle, of course, it should not matter whether chemical information
is obtained from mandatory or voluntary mechanisms. Neither reliance on
voluntary programs nor the absence of formal action to obtain data is proof that
the data do not exist. Industry asserts that voluntary programs have in fact been
highly successful, 89 and cooperative programs clearly have their uses. 90
However, since the testing is voluntary, EPA has little ability to fill gaps that
remain. For example, EPA's touted HPV Challenge program has been severely
criticized by one of its co-sponsors, Environmental Defense, as providing far
fewer data than promised, and years late, 91 and EPA's Inspector General
reports that EPA's many voluntary programs lack the kinds of data collection
and internal controls that are needed to determine whether the programs are in
fact successful.
92
In sum, TSCA is as ungainly as it was designed to be. The central
legislative compromise was that TSCA would grant comprehensive authority to
EPA but that it would be difficult to use. As it turned out-and, in retrospect,
not surprisingly-the difficulty of use in essence trumped the comprehensive
authority; the authority is not really comprehensive if it cannot be deployed.
As a result, despite CEQ's careful analysis in Toxic Substances and the high
hopes of TSCA's proponents, TSCA has substantially under-performed as a
generator of chemical information and a regulator of industrial chemicals. The
great majority of chemicals remain largely unstudied for any but the most
obvious effects, and EPA would have tremendous difficulties in restricting
dangerous uses, even if these effects were known.
87. Id. at 17-18.
88. Id. at 10. This is not new. In 1983, the Office of Technology Assessment reported that about
half of PMNs contained no toxicity information at all, and less than 20% contained data on long-term
toxicity. OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT, THE INFORMATION CONTENT OF PRE-MANUFACTURE NOTICES
6-7,49-54(1983).
89. See Cohen, supra note 85 (quoting industry spokespeople); Conrad, supra note 76, at 143.
90. Conrad, supra note 78, at 143-46 (requiring disclosures), 153-57 (encouraging voluntary
programs); U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 66, at 40-43; U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
Office of Pollution Prevention & Toxics, supra note 61.
91. DENISON, supra note 77.
92. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY OFFICE OF INSPECTOR GENERAL, EVALUATION REPORT:
VOLUNTARY PROGRAMS COULD BENEFIT FROM INTERNAL POLICY CONTROLS AND A SYSTEMATIC
MANAGEMENT APPROACH, Report No. 2007-P-00041 (Sept. 25, 2007), available at http://
www.epa.gov/oig/reports/2007/20070925-2007-P-00041 .pdf.
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II. ANTITHESIS: REACH AND ITS PROMISE
A. The EU Response to TSCA
REACH was designed to correct weaknesses in the existing chemical
regulatory system in Europe. Some of the weaknesses were distinct to the
European system. For example, prior to REACH, an array of complicated
directives and regulations covered the chemical industry, and the public
expressed a widespread desire to reduce animal testing. However, REACH was
also designed to correct the weaknesses apparent in the U.S. experience. While
neither the White Paper nor the formal explanatory memorandum that
accompanied the actual legislation mention TSCA by name, it is hard to read
them as anything other than an effort to make REACH everything that TSCA
was not.
The EU spent nearly a decade developing REACH. The European
Commission identified the need for the regulation, undertook a thorough study
of the issues, and proposed the legislation. The REACH proposal went through
the complex European legislative process and received the approval (with
amendments) of the other main governmental organs (the Council and the
European Parliament) in December 2006. The legislation is in the form of a
regulation (as opposed to a directive), which means that it is self-executing and
does not require further legislative action by each member state. The EU uses
regulations when uniformity is of particular importance, and an important
objective of REACH was to harmonize the existing system of multiple and
overlapping regulatory systems that was believed to hamper the
competitiveness of the Europe-wide industry.
Along with its commitment to centralization, REACH maintains an active
role for the member states. Member state regulators (known as "Competent
Authorities" in REACH) participate in most of the regulatory phases in a
variety of ways, but they may not take unilateral action, in deference to
REACH's goal of harmonization. A new European Chemicals Agency
(ECHA), headquartered in Helsinki, manages and coordinates all of the aspects
of the process. ECHA's role is primarily administrative, but it also provides
scientific and technical advice. The latter role involves committees on risk
assessment and on socio-economic analysis, which are made up of outside
experts. 93 ECHA's regulatory decision-making authority is limited to the more
technical aspects of REACH (such as the evaluation phase, described below);
decision-making authority at the more policy-rich phases is reserved for the
Commission and the member states acting in concert.
94
93. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 64.
94. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, REACH IN BRIEF: How WILL REACH WORK? WHAT ARE THE
COSTS AND BENEFITS? WHAT IS THE STATE OF PLAY? 14 (September 15, 2004), available at http://
ec.europa.eu/enterprise/reach/docs/reach/reach in brief-2004_09_15.pdf [hereinafter REACH IN BRIEF]
(describing the structure and role of ECHA).
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While it simplified the existing regulatory structure for chemicals,
REACH is by no means a simple piece of legislation. For present purposes, the
basic regulatory process breaks down into four constituent parts, reflected in
the elements of the REACH acronym: registration, evaluation, authorization,
and restrictions. The first phase, registration, is primarily a data-gathering
procedure. It covers all chemicals produced or imported in quantities above one
metric ton per year, both new and existing (or "phase-in"), as well as certain
substances found in other products. There are various exemptions for low-risk
chemicals and polymers, but the ECHA expects to need to register thirty
thousand chemicals and review eighty thousand dossiers by 2011.95
Applications for the registration of any chemical must include a technical
dossier, which is comprehensive information on the chemical's inherent
properties, including a base set of toxicological information, graduated by
production volume. For chemicals produced in quantities above ten metric tons,
a much more extensive Chemical Safety Report is required, which includes
toxicology and exposure data, as well as measures to reduce risks from the
chemical. 96 Chemical data, including those obtained in registration, is shared
up and down the supply chain to avoid unnecessary testing.97
The second phase, evaluation, involves three basic steps: an automatic
"completeness check" for technical compliance with the REACH requirements;
a dossier evaluation, which is essentially a quality control effort to assure that
objectives like avoidance of animal testing and data sharing have occurred; and
substance evaluation, which examines the risks posed by a substance and the
measures taken to control the risks. 98 Evaluation leads to the two final phases.
Authorization applies to substances "of very high concern" (VHC). 99
VHC substances include carcinogens, mutagens, and reproductively toxic
(CMR) substances; persistent, bioaccumulative, or toxic (PBT) substances;
very persistent or very bioaccumulative (vPvB) substances; persistent organic
pollutants (POPs); and other chronic hazards. Authorization is not limited to
chemicals that meet the registration threshold amount of one metric ton. The
primary objective of authorization is to ensure the progressive replacement of
VHCs with safer alternatives; therefore, the centerpiece of the process is
analysis of substitute substances. Each proponent of a VHC chemical must
present a replacement chemical or at least a research plan for alternatives; if no
alternatives are in prospect, then the chemical's use must be justified under a
cost-benefit test. In addition, authorization requires that the substance be
95. EUROPEAN COMM'N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON REACH 3 (July 2007), available at
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/chemicals/pdf/qa.pdf.
96. REACH, supra note 45, at annex I.
97. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 94, at 7; REACH, supra note 45, at arts. 5-14,31-36.
98. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 94, at 8-9; REACH, supra note 45, at arts. 40-54.
99. For authorization, REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 94 at 9-10; REACH, supra note 45, at arts.
55-66. The term "very high concern" appears in REACH article 55. For Restrictions see REACH IN
BRIEF, supra note 94, at 10; REACH, supra note 45, at arts. 67-73.
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"adequately controlled," and if it cannot be adequately controlled1 ° ° (CMR
substances, by definition, cannot be), then, again, its benefits must outweigh its
risks. ECHA expects that about 1,500 substances will require authorization. It
is expected that VHC substances will be banned entirely, authorized for a
limited period, or authorized for very specific uses and conditions.
The final phase is restriction. While the objective of authorization is
replacement, substances that are not subject to authorization but nevertheless
pose hazards in their manufacture or use may have European Community-wide
restrictions imposed on them to assure that health and environmental risks
remain at acceptable levels. Such restrictions may be imposed centrally if the
Commission, in cooperation with the member states, determines that the risk is
not adequately controlled and that it needs to be addressed at the Community-
wide level. The legal standard for acceptability is not stated10 1 other than a
general commitment to a "high level of protection." Restrictions represent
REACH's "safety net," or last resort, for ensuring chemical safety.
10 2
B. REACH as the Anti-TSCA
REACH adopts several techniques that tacitly reverse the TSCA approach,
the most important of which are eliminating the distinction between new and
existing chemicals, shifting the burden of proof for producing information, and
requiring a demonstration of safety by the proponent of a chemical.
1. Existing Uses
In contrast to the approach chosen by the U.S. Congress in TSCA,
REACH explicitly seeks to eliminate the distinction between existing and new
chemicals (and uses). Its purpose is to remedy the data gap for existing
chemicals 103-what the White Paper calls "the burden of the past"'104 -which
will permit the application of a single, high level of safety to all chemicals, new
and old. The general principle that chemicals must be shown to be safe before
use also means that existing chemicals are subject to the same rigorous
standards that a new chemical would be. Retrospective examination of existing
substances or activities is inevitably a daunting task, especially when there are
new standards to apply. The difficulty of this ambition accounts for the
frequency of "grandfathering" language in regulatory statutes. TSCA, for
example, grandfathers existing chemicals by imposing a screening procedure
(the PMN process) only on new chemicals. REACH tackles the challenge of
100. REACH, supra note 45, at arts. 60(4), 64(4)(a)-(b).
101. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 68(1).
102. Id.
103. The White Paper defines "burden of the past" as "[tihe 30,000 'existing' chemicals estimated
to be on the EU market, for which little or no information is available, in particular about their long-term




revisiting existing chemicals to generate information and evaluate safety by
"implement[ing] a step by step process to address the burden of the past and
develop adequate knowledge for existing substances that industry wants to
continue marketing."' 10 5 Over an eleven-year period, regulatory authorities are
required to examine all thirty thousand existing chemicals that are produced in
volumes greater than one metric ton, and to categorize and evaluate them as
they would new chemicals. Much of the controversy over REACH, and much
of the administrative challenge, is the insistence on applying new standards of
information and assessment to existing chemicals.
2. Generation of New Information
A second fundamental difference between TSCA and REACH is the
approach to regulating the vast range of chemicals. While TSCA's preamble
states that the responsibility for generating chemical information should lie
with the manufacturer, the opposite has been the case in practice; instead the
regulator is held to a high standard for generating information. TSCA requires
manufacturers to submit data only when there are new uses, and places
substantial burdens on EPA when it seeks to generate or require more. REACH
takes the opposite tack. Since REACH seeks to take a fundamentally
precautionary approach to protecting the environment and human health when
data are uncertain, REACH demands that better information be generated and
that, in the absence of such information, chemicals be highly restricted or
prohibited outright. As a consequence, the responsibility for generating new
information is allocated to the proponent of the use of the chemical.
REACH makes the generation of information a priority. "The lack of data
on the hazardous properties of chemicals was the driving force behind the
development of a new chemicals policy in the EU,"'106 and so REACH moves
the status quo from "no data, no problem" to "no data, no market" (the title of
article 5 of REACH):
Subject to Articles 6, 7, 21 and 23, substances on their own, in preparations
or in articles shall not be manufactured in the Community or placed on the
market unless they have been registered in accordance with the relevant
provisions of this Title where this is required.
As discussed above, registration is primarily an information-provision
process, 10 7 the centerpiece of which is the submission by applicants of a
Chemical Safety Report 108 for existing substances produced in quantities over
ten metric tons. In this way, REACH attempts to eliminate the old-new
distinction in chemical data, at least for medium and high production volume
105. Id. at 7-8.
106. ASSESSMENT OF ADDITIONAL TESTING NEEDS, supra note 58, at 5.
107. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 10.
108. Id. at art. 14.
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chemicals, and requires that substantive information be produced for all
chemical uses.
3. Burden of Proof of Safety
The allocation of burden of proof is more than just a means to a regulatory
end; it is also a normative position. Burden of proof expresses a fundamental
public policy by placing the responsibility for determining a chemical's safety
either with the manufacturer or with the government, making it either an
essentially private or essentially public decision, respectively. The normative
burden of proof also gives direction to regulators in their substantive evaluation
of a chemical, telling them how selective to be, how doubts are to be resolved,
and how judgment is to be exercised.
The allocation of the burden of proof has practical consequences for the
number of chemicals that will be approved, and the terms under which they will
be approved, for use. Most importantly, it has the instrumental effect of
encouraging one party or the other to generate information to persuade the
decision-maker, because the party with the burden must move the status quo.
For example, a status quo of no-approval with the burden on the private
applicant will encourage the applicant to provide the information needed to
demonstrate that its product is safe and effective for its intended purpose. In
contrast, placing the burden of proof on the regulator has the opposite effect on
private party behavior, encouraging secrecy or ignorance. It is affirmatively up
to the agency to seek out information or else to abandon regulatory effects.
TSCA, as discussed above, places the burden of proof squarely on the
regulator to support a finding of the existence of an "unreasonable risk."
Professor Wagner has called TSCA "unprecautionary" on this and other
grounds, 10 9 and the burden of proof clearly contributes to TSCA's
ineffectiveness. Before REACH, European chemicals regulation placed the
burden of proof in the same "unprecautionary" manner. As the Commission's
White Paper said,
[t]he current approach requires authorities to provide convincing
arguments, usually in the context of a risk assessment, before restriction
measures are taken. Their task is further complicated because the current
system does not encourage industry to support the assessment. On the
contrary, delaying the process is 'rewarded' with an extended marketing
period.' 10
The requirement for specific findings and the "substantial evidence" standard
of judicial review in TSCA intensify the general burden on the agency and
therefore increase its reluctance to regulate.
109. Wendy E. Wagner, The Precautionary Principle and Chemical Regulations in the U.S., 6
HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 459, 468 (2000) (suggesting that TSCA embodies an
"unprecautionary principle").
110. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 19.
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REACH once again takes the opposite approach. Article 1 of the
legislation states:
[This Regulation] is based on the principle that it is for manufacturers,
importers and downstream users to ensure that they manufacture, place on
the market or use such substances that do not adversely affect human health
or the environment. 11I
REACH thus requires manufacturers to take affirmative, substantial action in
order to retain their markets. The overall normative message, therefore, is that
chemical risks should be controlled, eliminated, mitigated, or justified by their
creators.
While registration itself "does not imply any form of approval by the
Agency of the assessment or use of the substance," 1 2 chemicals of "very high
concern" (that is, which are subject to authorization based on intrinsic
properties of toxicity, persistence, or bioaccumulation) require actual
approval. 1 3 That approval involves adequate control of a hazardous chemical
and a substitution plan. As we have seen, if no substitutes are in prospect, then
the manufacturer must present a socio-economic justification for continued
marketing, and without that, the use is denied approval.1 14 To turn a phrase,
where TSCA urges caution in regulating industrial chemicals, REACH urges
precaution in approving them.
Nevertheless, REACH is not entirely consistent in this regard. The
restriction procedure, the safety net of the overall REACH process,115 in which
the Commission imposes general limitations on the use of a chemical, seems to
return to the TSCA burden of proof. The Commission first assembles a dossier
on the effects of the chemical, based on the manufacturer's chemical safety
report. If the dossier "demonstrates that action on a Community-wide basis is
necessary," then restrictions are imposed. 116 The grammatical construction of
the text--"if this dossier demonstrates"-and use of the term "necessary"
suggest that the burden is on the Commission to justify action, which is a
departure from the overall objective to place the burden on industry. 117
Moreover, the administrative process within the Commission ("comitology," in
Euro-jargon) for imposing restrictions (opinions of Risk Assessment and Socio-
Economic Analysis Committees must be solicited and responded to' 18), and the
111. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 1(1)(3).
112. REACH IN BRIEF, supra note 94, at 6.
113. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 55.
114. Id. at arts. 55, 60.
115. Commission Proposal, supra note 1, at 12, 16.
116. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 69(3).
117. Veerle Heyvaert, Guidance without Constraint: Assessing the Impact of the Precautionary
Principle on the European Community's Chemicals Policy, 6 Y.B. OF EUR. ENVTL. LAW 27, 50-56
(2006) [hereinafter Guidance without Constraint].
118. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 64.
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review process with other organs, adopt a level of procedural complexity" l9
that in some ways rivals TSCA.120
C. New Ideas in REACH
REACH also differs from TSCA by adopting several important regulatory
techniques that were not yet available at the time of TSCA's enactment.
REACH thus offers a particularly interesting glimpse of the next generation of
chemicals regulation as enacted by the governments of industrialized countries.
A whole range of provisions in REACH, especially the burdens of information
production and the burden of proof, reflect a more general decision to take a
precautionary approach, that is, explicitly to permit regulation of chemicals in
advance of full information as a means of affording greater protection to human
health and the environment. REACH also puts an emphasis on the continuing
development of new and safer alternatives, and on the public's right to know
the hazards to which they are exposed.
1. The Precautionary Principle
Precaution made its first major appearance as a distinct principle of
international environmental law in the 1985 Vienna Convention for the
Protection of the Ozone Layer, which recognized the continuing scientific
uncertainty surrounding ozone depletion but insisted on moving forward
nevertheless to meet this environmental threat. It did not enter the American
environmental consciousness until the late 1990s. Thus, while the
"precautionary principle" was not available as a concept to the drafters of
TSCA, it was an important foundational concept for the drafters of REACH.1 2 1
The EU Treaty incorporates the precautionary principle in the basic statement
of European environmental policy, 122 and the Commission has issued an
119. Id. at arts. 70, 73, 133(4). See also Heyvaert, Guidance without Constraint, supra note 117, at
49; Veerle Heyvaert, No Data, No Market: The Future of EU Chemicals Control under the REACH
Regulation, 9 ENVTL. L. REV. 201, 203 (2007).
120. The Regulatory with Scrutiny review procedure, required by REACH art. 133(4), involves
both another layer of internal Commission review, and also substantive involvement by the European
Parliament and Council. Council Decision 1999/468/EC, art. 5, 1999 O.J. (L 184) 23, 25. A
controversial restriction could be considerably delayed through this process.
121. While the Precautionary Principle clearly "played a highly prominent role" in the adoption of
REACH, Professor Heyvaert persuasively challenges the assumption that the Precautionary Principle
actually determined to content of the legislation in ways that would not have happened without the
formal adoption of the principle in European law. Heyvaert, Guidance without Constraint, supra note
117, at 51. For present purposes, the influence of the Precautionary Principle will be considered relevant
to the extent of its consistency with REACH provisions (which Heyvaert finds) and even providing "a
language in which to express [pro-protection] concerns." Id. at 45.
122. Consolidated Versions of the Treaty of European Union and of the Treaty Establishing the
European Community, art 174(2), Dec. 29, 2006, 2006 O.J. (C 321) 1 [hereinafter Treaty of European
Union].
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interpretive guide to the precautionary principle, 123 which has gained general
acceptance from the other principal organs of European governance, including
an enthusiastic judicial reception. 124 The authors of REACH expressly
recognized the importance of the precautionary principle to the new regulatory
regime, 125 and article 1 of REACH states that its "provisions are underpinned
by the precautionary principle."'
12 6
The central purpose of the precautionary principle is to authorize
regulatory action in the face of scientific uncertainty. The most widely accepted
version of the principle reads:
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be
widely applied by States according to their capabilities. Where there are
threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full scientific certainty
shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to
prevent environmental degradation. 
12 7
As Professor Fisher explains, this means that, procedurally, no evidence of
harm is not to be equated with evidence of no harm. 128 For a regulatory system
that is committed to preventing harm, lack of data cannot justify inaction;
rather, the (relative) safety of a chemical should be demonstrated by its
proponents, typically its manufacturers. Rhetorically, the precautionary
principle takes away the argument that a chemical should be approved because
its harmful effects remain uncertain. Supported by the allocation of the burden
of proof, REACH takes this general approach. For example, REACH directs
that safety assessments be based on the information that gives the greatest
cause for concern. 129 In contrast, the findings and substantial evidence
requirements in TSCA by their nature declare that no evidence of harm has the
same procedural effect as evidence of no harm. As a result, TSCA has spawned
an entire industry of raising uncertainties as a defense against regulation.
Although REACH rests firmly upon a precautionary approach, the
European Commission's incorporation of the precautionary principle is not
123. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1 final
(Feb. 2, 2000). The Commission's interpretation of the Precautionary Principle represents a very modest
version or interpretation of the principle. More aggressive interpretations exist, but they do not form the
basis of REACH. See, e.g., John S. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, 27 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L.J. 13, 17-20 (2002).
124. See Elizabeth Fisher, Precaution, Precaution Everywhere: Developing a "Common
Understanding" of the Precautionary Principle in the European Community, 9:1 MAASTRICHT J. OF
EUR. & COMP. L. 7, 12 (2002); Heyvaert, Guidance without Constraint, supra note 117, at 28, 33, 35.
125. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 5.
126. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 1(3).
127. United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, June 3-14, 1992, Rio
Declaration on Environment and Development, 15, U.N. Doc A/CONF.151/26 (June 14, 1992)
[hereinafter Rio Declaration].
128. Fisher, supra note 124, at 9.
129. REACH, supra note 45, at annex I, §§ 1.1.4, 3.1.5 (suggesting general provisions for safety
assessments and chemical safety reports); EUROPEAN COMM'N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON REACH,
supra note 95, at 3.
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intended to be a wholesale revision of the philosophy of environmental
protection. Instead, by placing the precautionary principle within the larger
framework of risk analysis, limiting the use of the principle to situations of
demonstrable uncertainty, and especially by requiring follow-up research to
resolve uncertainties, the Commission indicated that the precautionary principle
is primarily a means of avoiding stalemate and inaction in the common
situation of scientific uncertainty. 130 REACH maintains the common regulatory
approach of aiming for proportionate controls in applying the precautionary
principle. Thus, rather than opting for a stricter approach to the precautionary
principle that would ban all uses in the face of uncertainty, the authorization
and restriction processes mandate some economic balancing of risks and
benefits to permit some uses to go forward, subject to future revision and
development of alternatives. In effect, REACH interprets the precautionary
principle to be based on scientific inquiry that establishes the existence of a
potential harm, and then to require follow-up inquiry to resolve uncertainties if
regulatory action goes forward without full certainty.
2. Substitution of Safer Alternatives
The REACH approach to chemical regulation also plays out in its robust
provisions for the ongoing development of alternatives and risk reduction.
REACH does not seek to avoid all use of industrial chemicals or to achieve a
chemical-free future. Instead, like TSCA, it seeks to limit the risks posed by
chemicals in commerce by deploying substantive standards that acknowledge
both the utility and the dangers of these substances. Unlike TSCA, however,
REACH also adopts regulatory techniques that expressly provide strong
incentives for the development of new and toxicologically safer chemicals. 131
Dangerous chemicals are to be "progressively replaced by suitable alternative
substances or technologies where these are economically and technologically
viable." 132 The approach of progressive substitution not only limits political
opposition and possibly the economic dislocation that would accompany a
strategy of simply banning dangerous chemicals, but it also takes advantage of,
and indeed incentivizes, innovation in the chemical industry.
REACH seeks to achieve the goal of substitution principally by allocating
the overall burden of demonstrating safety, recognizing that safer chemicals
will be easier to justify. In addition, manufacturers are held generally
responsible for the safety of their chemicals. Furthermore, manufacturers must
130. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 123, at 13-
15, 20-21.
13 1. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 5, 8.
132. REACH, supra note 45, art. 55; see also Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 8 (stating
that "[i]t is essential to promote the competitiveness of the chemical industry and encourage innovation,
and in particular the development of safer chemicals."). TSCA, in contrast, emphasizes innovation
generally and the concern is avoidance of negative effects on innovation rather than taking affirmative
steps to direct it. TSCA § 2(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. § 260 1(b)(3) (2006).
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provide hazard information to downstream users of chemicals and to
consumers. 133 As California has found with its Proposition 65, pointed public
information is a strong incentive to use only the safest chemicals. 134 The
registration requirement is thus itself an incentive to use safe and well-tested
substances, since the registration information is public and the absence of
testing will be exposed-and must be remedied-through the registration
process.
The authorization procedure that is required for the most dangerous
chemicals creates an even more intense regulatory incentive to find safer
substitutes. Authorization is public, expensive, and if the chemical is not
adequately controlled, the manufacturer must show that benefits outweigh
costs. Especially in the context of the normative messages incorporated into the
regulation, this public analysis is likely to be highly critical of the
manufacturers. Finally, authorization and restriction require the disclosure and
analysis of substitute substances. 13 5 A lawyer at a European branch of an
American law firm was recently quoted as saying that companies that make a
chemical of high concern must "be ready for a long and never-ending battle" to
continue to market it, 136 which is surely a powerful incentive to look for
substitutes.
3. Transparency and the Right to Know
The efforts at creating safer alternatives are bolstered by the robust "right-
to-know" provisions in REACH. Since the passage of TSCA, environmental
law has seen the development of right-to-know legislation as a way to regulate
chemicals. Like burden of proof, right-to-know laws have both normative and
instrumental purposes. The normative purpose gives the legislation its name:
citizens are entitled to know the chemicals to which they are exposed and the
chemicals' effects. Since they are potentially affected, citizens have a right to
respond to the information with individual choice (such as purchasing),
133. Commission White Paper, supra note 2, at 8; see also REACH, supra note 45, at preamble
paras. 13, 33, 47, 49, 50, and 64.
134. See generally Clifford Rechtschaffen & Patrick Williams, The Continued Success of
Proposition 65 in Reducing Toxic Exposures, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10850 (2005) (continuing effectiveness
of Prop 65); Carl Cranor, Information Generation and Use under Proposition 65: Model Provisions for
Other Postmarket Laws? 83 IND. L.J. 609, 613-14 (2008). Industry continues to resist such measures
vigorously. The Bush Administration EPA recently published a rule that reduces considerably the
information that must be reported to EPA under the Toxics Release Inventory. Toxics Release Inventory
Burden Reduction Final Rule, 71 Fed. Reg. 76,932 (December 22, 2006) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt.
372).
135. REACH, supra note 45, at arts. 55, 60(4)-(5) (referring to authorization), 68(1), Annex XV-
XVII (referring to restrictions). Massachusetts directly encourages substitution through the Toxics Use
Reduction Act (TURA), Mass. Gen. Laws ch. 211 (2004 & Supp. 2006), which requires the creation of
actual toxics reduction and substitution plans, which are not necessarily available to the public, to
encourage internally motivated action by firms rather than to generate public pressure.
136. Pat Phibbs-Rizzto, European Hazardous Chemicals Lists May Give Clues on 'Very High
Concern'Items, 30 INT'L. ENVTL. REP. (BNA) 396 (May 16,2007).
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litigation, and political action. The instrumental purpose of right-to-know laws
is to embarrass the users or emitters of chemicals, which has been shown in
California and elsewhere to act as a strong incentive to reduce or replace the
chemicals. 137 The seemingly universal availability of the internet-another
post-TSCA development-magnifies the potential of public information to
embarrass producers and to affect individuals' decisions and to facilitate
individual and collective action.
REACH relies on a range of mechanisms to facilitate and require the flow
of information up and dcwn the entire supply chain, 138 as well as to
government agencies and the general public. 139 It relies heavily on the
existence of publicly available data and its ready accessibility to anyone via the
internet. 140 Public information is another spur to industry to develop new, safer
substitute products. 14 1 Not only can public information be expected to create a
demand among the general public to reduce the use of toxic substances, but the
greater availability of specialized information will result in legal pressure-
through regulation or litigation-by non-governmental organizations to reduce
the use of toxic chemicals. 14
2
4. Reduced Animal Testing
While the use of animals to test the toxicological effects of chemicals is a
major concern among a relatively small segment of the U.S. population, the
issue is quite salient in Europe. As a result, reduction of animal testing is a
major stated objective of REACH. 14 3 This creates a dilemma: the reduction of
animal testing runs directly counter to the commitment to generate more test
data. Since testing has always been a major cost for industry, however, concern
over animal testing has resulted in some strange political bedfellows. Together,
industry and animal rights groups engineered several regulatory innovations to
reduce the need for testing while supporting a strongly data-based regulatory
system. These include mandatory data sharing, "one substance one
registration,"'144 only invertebrate and in vitro testing for the lowest production
137. Cranor, supra note 134, at 613-14; see also Rechtschaffen & Williams, supra note 134, at
10850-10856 (reporting on continuing reductions of toxic substances in products and emissions).
138. REACH, supra note 45, at arts. 31-39.
139. Id. at arts. 118-19.
140. Id. at arts. 77(2)(e), 119.
141. EUROPEAN COMM'N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON REACH, supra note 95, at 26.
142. In addition, the EU will be considerably less receptive to claims of confidential business
information. REACH, supra note 45, at arts. 118-119; see also EUROPEAN COMM'N, QUESTIONS AND
ANSWERS ON REACH, supra note 95, § 13.1 (stating must affirmatively approve claims); DENISON,
supra note 61, at VIII-8-1 1.
143. Commission White Paper, supra note 2, at 7; e.g. REACH, supra note 45, at preamble arts. 13,
33.
144. REACH, supra note 45, art. 25. "One substance, one registration" in effect permits the use of
data in one company's registration of a chemical to be used in all registrations. By avoiding the
duplicative registration of individual chemicals, REACH seeks to reduce the amount of animal testing
required.
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volume chemicals,' 45 pre-registration and dossier review to determine whether
animal testing can be avoided, acceptance of non-EU test results, discouraging
repeated testing, and the widespread acceptance of non-vertebrate testing. 14 6 In
the debates over REACH, industry and animal rights groups both emphasized
the uncertainties of animal tests as a surrogate for testing on humans, and they
agreed on the desirability of finding alternatives. 147 The upshot is a strong
commitment in REACH to in vitro (non-animal) testing and the development of
reliable quantitative chemical structure-activity (QSAR) analysis and in vitro
testing as a substitute for traditional animal testing. By translating the results of
non-animal testing to mammalian effects, QSARs aspire to be the cheap, "fast
track option to deal with data gaps on chemicals," 148 and they do not require
the use of animal models (at least, not after the initial effect and potency
models have been determined). Animal testing is to be a last resort in all
cases. 149 To the extent that the mandate for non-animal testing results in faster,
cheaper, and reliable assessment of chemicals, it is an idea that also holds
general promise for improved chemicals regulation.
III. SYNTHESIS: SHARED IDEAS AND TSCA REFORM
Synthesis, in the Hegelian conception, is a new paradigm that grows out of
the conflict of thesis and antithesis. Therefore, in seeking a synthesis of
chemical regulatory regimes, especially a synthesis that could be implemented
as reform of TSCA, it will be most promising to examine elements common to
TSCA and REACH, correction of the worst failures of TSCA, and the most
useful new ideas in REACH.
The time is right to develop such a synthesis. TSCA is clearly overdue for
reform, as the litany of disappointments and criticisms in Part II demonstrates.
The passage of REACH has produced an avalanche of concern in the United
States about chemical regulation, because hundreds of American companies
145. Id. at art. 12.
146. These are specifically mentioned in all of the Annex lists of required testing, especially
Annex. XI, which provides for waivers of testing. See id. at Annex XI.
147. European Comm'n, Scientific Comm. on Toxicity, Ecotoxicity & the Envt., Opinion on the
BUA V-ECEAE Report, "The Way Forward-Action to End Animal Toxicity Testing" (January 8, 2004),
available at http://ec.europa.eu/health/ph risk/committees/sct/documents/out2l7_en.pdf [hereinafter
The Way Forward]. In the United States, animal testing has encountered some skepticism by courts
reviewing agency action (e.g., Gulf South Insulation v. Consumer Product Safety Comm'n, 701 F.2d
1137, 1147 (5th Cir. 1983)), and so acceptance of non-animal testing will probably take some time. See,
e.g. U.S. GOv'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, supra note 64, at 11-15 (suggesting QSAR is not ready for
prime time). EPA has in fact pioneered the use of QSAR techniques as part of its PMN review process,
and the National Academy of Sciences recently reported that non-animal testing will become
increasingly reliable and increasingly common. NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 51, at 3.
And, to the extent that such methods turn out to be reliable, cheap, and fast, they will further the
protective goals of chemical regulation.
148. Assessment ofAdditional Testing Needs, supra note 58, at 7.
149. Id. at art. 25(1).
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will need to learn how to comply to maintain important European markets1 50
and the chemical information that is generated in response to REACH will be
available (more or less instantaneously) in the United States. Congress has
begun to take a serious interest in REACH and its possible relation to TSCA
reform, and environmental groups are creating pressure to do so. Efforts to
adopt REACH-like statutes in the states, particularly a state like California, are
likely to put pressure on Congress in 2009 to reform TSCA to avoid an
inconsistent, piecemeal regulatory scheme in this country. 151 Under these
circumstances, TSCA reform, long overdue, is a realistic prospect.
A. Plus 9a change, plus c'est la m~me chose
While REACH is the anti-TSCA in several important ways, the regulatory
regimes actually have much in common. CEQ's 1971 Toxic Substances report
perceptively identified the key challenges in regulating industrial chemicals,
and the basic structure of TSCA represents an integrated, comprehensive
approach. The European Union seeks to accomplish essentially the same goals
with REACH. Although REACH embodies a range of innovations-shifting
the burden of proof, eliminating the distinction between new and existing
chemicals, methodically addressing the "burden of the past," reducing reliance
on non-animal testing, and so on-these mostly reflect efforts to shape
different, and presumably more effective, techniques for accomplishing shared
goals.
1. Twin Goals of Environmental and Economic Health
The fundamental objectives of both TSCA and REACH are protection of
human health and the environment, and protection of the economic health of
their respective chemical industries.1 52 As between the two, both also give
nominal primacy to protecting health and the environmental protection. TSCA:
authority over chemical substances and mixtures should be exercised in
such a manner as not to impede unduly or create unnecessary economic
barriers to technological innovation while fulfilling the primary purpose of
this chapter to assure that such innovation and commerce in such chemical
substances and mixtures do not present an unreasonable risk of injury to
health or the environment. 153
Likewise, REACH:
The purpose of this Regulation is to ensure a high level of protection of
human health and the environment,... as well as the free circulation of
150. U.S. Commercial Service Website, U.S. Mission to the European Union, http:/
www.buyusa.gov/europeanunion/reach.html (last visited November 7, 2008).
151. See Pat Rizzuto, Report Supplement: Toxic Substances: Preparation for REACH, State
Legislation Likely to Consume Chemical Industry's Time, 39 ENVT. REP. (BNA) 185 (Jan. 18, 2008).
152. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 4.
153. TSCA § 2(b)(3), 15 U.S.C. 2601(b)(3) (2006) (emphasis added).
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substances on the internal market while enhancing competitiveness and
innovation. 154
REACH was jointly sponsored by the Enterprise and Industry and the
Environment directorates general (DGs). DG Enterprise and Industry
repeatedly emphasized the benefits to the chemical industry of maintaining
confidence in chemicals and of spurring innovation.155
Each system balances one goal against the other. TSCA's "unreasonable
risk" standard expressly takes into account economic and social factors. In
REACH, this balance is seen as an embodiment of "the overriding goal of
sustainable development," to which the EU is committed. 156 The balance struck
between the goals is significantly different, primarily in that REACH is far less
compromised by procedural complexity and strict judicial review.
Nevertheless, both systems aim to shape (and, if possible, enhance) rather than
eliminate the chemical industry.
2. Chemicals as Chemicals
Both TSCA and REACH chose to regulate chemicals themselves, rather
than their presence in various environmental media, because media-based
regulation requires greater complexity and would likely have unintended
consequences that flow from fractured and overlapping authorities. TSCA
addressed these concerns by regulating chemical substances and providing
wide ranging control authorities to cover manufacture, use, and disposal. 157 It
also encouraged EPA to use TSCA to coordinate the activities of the media-
specific federal statutes. 158
Although of similar approach, REACH does not even discuss media-based
approaches, probably because the idea of regulating chemicals as such was
already well established in EU law. Europe also has a constitutional
commitment that "environmental damage should as a priority be rectified at
[its] source,"'159 which clearly favors the chemical-specific approach. Of even
greater immediate importance to the drafters of REACH was the need to
harmonize and rationalize the many different EU regulations and directives and
their interpretations in all of the member states into "a single coherent
system."' 60 The regulation of chemicals as such advances all of these goals and
represents a basic commonality between the statutes.
154. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 1 (1) (emphasis added).
155. See EUROPEAN COMM'N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON REACH, supra note 95, § 13.4.
156. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 4 (emphasis in original).
157. TSCA § 6(a).
158. Id. § 9(b); see also Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap, supra note 20, at 330-32.
159. Treaty of European Union, supra note 122, at art. 174(2).
160. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 16.
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3. Prevention
When TSCA was enacted in 1976, the idea of prevention as a complement
to the tort system was perhaps not yet firmly established, and it was necessary
to emphasize it. 161 Thirty years later, the European Commission's White Paper
hardly needed to argue the point: "decisionmaking must be based on precaution
to prevent damage to human health and the environment." 162 By 2001, the
debate had moved beyond prevention to precaution. For some observers, the
precautionary principle had marked a fundamental shift from avoiding known
risks to anticipating suspected ones.1 63 The European Commission resisted the
most aggressive normative understandings of the precautionary principle and
insisted on a protective and anticipatory, but still strongly science-based and
cost-sensitive, approach. 164 REACH follows the Commission's interpretation
of the precautionary principle. 16 5 For instance, as we have seen, the
authorization and restriction procedures both involve risk-cost-benefit
balancing. The REACH approach to prevention is intended to be more
anticipatory than TSCA in the sense of being expressly less demanding of
scientific certainty in advance of regulation (i.e., adopting the precautionary
principle), but both fundamentally pursue the objective of preventing harm with
a risk-benefit measure of the proper level of control.
4. The Data Gap
Concern over the lack of chemical knowledge is perhaps the most striking
commonality of the two legislative regimes. It was a primary concern in Toxic
Substances in 1971, and TSCA provided a range of devices to fill the data gap.
The developers of REACH also sponsored studies of the data gap decades later,
which confirmed earlier findings of a serious problem. 166 However, they went
further and concluded that the data gap could not be filled by the TSCA
approach. The Commission asserted, "In fact, not one country has yet been
successful in overcoming the huge gap in knowledge of substances.' ' 167 While
REACH adopts a different data-acquisition strategy from TSCA, it has the
same basic objective of filling the data gap. Neither piece of legislation
addresses the problem at a fundamental level by seeking to "bridge" the gap by
161. US CEQ, supra note 2, at 20-21.
162. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 5 (emphasis added).
163. Applegate, The Taming of the Precautionary Principle, supra note 123, at 17-20.
164. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 123, at 3-5,
14, 18-21.
165. Commission Proposal, supra note 1, at 19; Heyvaert, Guidance without Constraint, supra note
117, at 51.
166. Assessment of Additional Testing Needs, supra note 58, at 5 (citing earlier studies); DENISON,
supra note 61, at VII1-8-1 1.
167. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 5.
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adopting regulatory standards that would require less information to operate.' 68
Instead, like TSCA, REACH is committed to an information-intensive
approach and provides mechanisms that are designed to generate
comprehensive data on chemicals for use by regulators.
5. Risk, Proportionality, and Cost
Both TSCA and REACH are based on the evaluation of probabilistic risk.
Rather than seeking simply to eliminate any chemical which might pose a risk,
TSCA and REACH instead evaluate the acceptability of risk of exposure as
weighted by the harm that would result from that toxic exposure. Both adopt a
probabilistic meaning of risk and abandon the bi-modal, safe-unsafe paradigm
of the Delaney Clause, discussed above. Although TSCA itself does not define
it, "risk" in the statute has uniformly been interpreted as a probabilistic
statement of the product of toxicity and exposure, with an acceptable level
lying at a point above zero. 169 REACH, too, relies on risk as the basis for
regulation. Intrinsic properties (such as carcinogenicity, mutagenicity, and
reproductive toxicity (CMR)), trigger data and evaluation requirements;
however, regulatory controls are ultimately based on intrinsic characteristics
and exposure levels, that is, on probabilistic risk. Both types of information are
required in the base set of data for registration, 170 in the chemical safety
report, 171 and in the terms of control for authorization. 172 Exposure levels are a
key element of control in restrictions. 173  Here again, the Commission's
interpretation of the precautionary principle lends support, by placing the
principle firmly in the context of risk management.174
The use of probabilistic risk and the commitment to proportionality beg
the question how to fix the point on the incremental scale of risk at which
regulatory action is triggered. 175 Both regulatory schemes seek to incorporate
cost considerations in making the determination of where and how to impose
controls. The "unreasonable" terminology in TSCA is notably unspecific, and
intentionally so, 17 6 but it is clear that EPA must consider cost as well as risk in
its determinations of "unreasonable risk." 177 The establishment of any
168. Technology-based standards, for example, demand relatively little chemical information,
while risk-based standards tend to require a great deal. Risk-based TSCA, in contrast, requires EPA to
consider a wide array of information, including alternatives, and it backs this up with specific required
findings and aggressive judicial review. Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap, supra note 20, at 1396-98;
Applegate & Fischman, supra note 32, at 402-04.
169. H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, at 14 (1976).
170. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 10(a), Annex VI.
171. Id. atart. 14.
172. Id. at art. 60(2).
173. Id. at arts. 69-70.
174. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 123, at 3.
175. Applegate, Perils, supra note 24, at 271-77.
176. HR. REP. No. 94-1341, at 13-14 (1976).
177. S. REP. No. 94-698, at 13,16,20 (1976); H.R. REP. No. 94-1341, at 13-14, 35 (1976).
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regulatory control must include "a statement with respect to" the human and
environmental risks of the chemical, the benefits and available substitutes for
the chemical, and "the reasonably ascertainable economic consequences of the
rule." 17
8
REACH also incorporates cost considerations. While the data
requirements of registration do not include the cost of regulation, though
information concerning uses is required,179 cost comes into play at the
authorization phase. Manufacture or import is presumptively banned based on
key intrinsic properties, but then it may be authorized for particular uses that
either can be adequately controlled 180 or, if they cannot (and CMRs by
definition cannot), then justified if benefits of the chemical outweigh its
environmental costs. 181 This, too, is in keeping with the Treaty on European
Union182 and the Communication on the Precautionary Principle,183 both of
which mandate the consideration of cost in imposing environmental
restrictions. Restrictions require the opinion of the Committee for Socio-
Economic Analysis, 184 and the Commission must justify a rejection of its
recommendations. 185
Risk in the probabilistic sense, and the consideration of cost and other
non-health factors, serve to ensure that the regulator's response to the risk is
proportionate to the scale of the problem identified. To underscore this point,
TSCA's regulatory measures are to be the "least burdensome" needed to
address the problem,186 and testing must be "necessary" to obtain information
that is "relevant" to regulatory decisions. 187 The restrictions must fit the risk, in
other words. Proportionality is also a basic principle of European law. 188 The
Commission made proportionality a major guideline for applying the
precautionary principle, 189 and proportionality permeates REACH, from the
amount of data to be provided in the registration phase 190 to the nature of the
restrictions applied to VHC chemicals. Although they differ substantially in the
balance that they strike, both REACH and TSCA, accept some level of risk
178. TSCA § 6(c)(1), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) (2006).
179. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 10(a).
180. "PBTs [persistent, bioaccumulative, or toxic], vPvBs [very persistent or very
bioaccumulative], and those CMR [carcinogenic, mutagenic, or reproductively toxic] substances for
which a safe level cannot be defined, cannot be authorized based on adequate control of risk." REACH
1N BRIEF, supra note 94, § 2.7.
181. REACH, supra note 45, at arts. 60(4), 64(4)(b).
182. Treaty of European Union, supra note 122, at art. 174(3).
183. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 123, at 19-
20.
184. REACH, supra note 45, at arts. 68(1), 71.
185. Id. at art. 73(1).
186. TSCA § 6(a), 15 U.S.C. § 2605(a) (2006).
187. Id. § 4(a).
188. PAUL CRAIG & GRAINNE DE BORCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND MATERIALS 349-57 (2d.
ed. 1998).
189. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 123, at 18.
190. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 3.
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from chemicals (as noted, neither envisions fundamental restructuring or
replacement of the chemical industry), and so they adopt regulatory standards
of probabilistic risk moderated by considerations of proportionality and cost.
6. Priorities
The acceptance of a spectrum of risk means that not all hazards are of
equal regulatory concern, which in turn counsels the wisdom (if not the
inevitability) of setting priorities. It is a reflection of both aspiration and
inexperience that early U.S. environmental statutes assumed that environmental
problems could be resolved once and for all within a fairly short period of time.
TSCA was perhaps ahead of its time in recognizing that its look-back device
for generating toxicological information, the section 4 test rule, would take
time to implement fully. The statute established an Interagency Testing
Committee (ITC) to create and update a priority list for testing existing
chemicals. 19 1 TSCA gives both flexibility (a very wide range of relevant
considerations) and direction (carcinogens, mutagens, and teratogens are
priorities) to the committee. However, while a priority list was developed and is
regularly updated, it is a short list19 2 (limited to fifty) by comparison to the
thousands of chemicals of regulatory concern. In any event, the testing
deadlines-and indeed the list itself-have been essentially ignored.
REACH, on the other hand, proceeding from a burden on the
manufacturer to obtain permission to sell or to continue to sell, has a far more
robust priority setting mechanism. "Prioritisation is built into the system
throughout."' 93 Since eliminating the data gap for existing chemicals is a
central objective of REACH, the legislation provides express guidance for a
"step by step process to address the 'burden of the past."" 94 REACH
incorporates a more sophisticated scheme for setting priorities based on hazard
or exposure. 195 For priority based on hazardous characteristics (that is, intrinsic
properties), REACH goes beyond CMR (which is in the TSCA section 4(e)
priorities) or HPV (the TSCA "B-Policy"), to focus in addition on persistence
and bioaccumulation. 196 As in the other aspects of the regulatory scheme that
we have examined, REACH seeks to implement more effective regulation,
rather than impose a radically different approach.
191. TSCA § 4(e).
192. Id. § 4(e)(1)(A).
193. EUROPEAN COMM'N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON REACH, supra note 95, § 2.5.2.
194. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 7.
195. EUROPEAN COMM'N, QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS ON REACH, supra note 95, § 2.5.2.
196. Another parallel is that both the CMR factors and production volume are testing priorities
under TSCA. TSCA § 4(a)(l)(B), 15 U.S.C. § 2603(a)(I)(B) (2006) (the so-called B-Policy for testing
high volume chemicals) and § 4(e) (criteria for the Interagency Testing Committee).
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7. Comprehensive Rationality
Finally, both TSCA and REACH adopt the general approach to regulation
that Professor McGarity calls "comprehensive analytical rationality.' 9 7 This
approach reaches decisions by gathering and systematically analyzing all of the
relevant information about a given problem and its potential, with the objective
of implementing the optimal regulatory response. Comprehensive rationality
includes and goes beyond the idea of synopticism. It does not merely seek to
address all aspects of a problem, but also to base decisions on analytical tools
that emphasize quantitative information and the search for a theoretically
optimized response.1
98
The aspiration to comprehensiveness is inherently data-hungry. More, it
implies that the data should be quantitative where possible in order to permit
formal analysis using tools like quantitative risk assessment and cost-benefit
analysis. The comprehensive aspirations of REACH and TSCA are evident in
the importance that each places on gathering information concerning chemicals.
The hazards are defined in terms of risk, itself a complex and multi-faceted
concept, and the acceptable level of risk is determined through an open-ended
analysis of benefits, costs, technologies, substitutes, and alternative approaches.
While TSCA does not mandate particular regulatory tools, REACH in effect
does by requiring the involvement in later stages of the process of a Committee
for Risk Assessment and a Committee for Socio-economic Analysis.
199
Both TSCA and REACH share a fundamental regulatory commitment to
science-based regulation. It is not coincidental that the above committees take
on the responsibilities of the Commission's Scientific Committees in this
area.200 While this may seem almost too obvious to mention, the commitment
has a history and important consequences. The history, very briefly, is that
science was responsible for many of the insights that brought environmental
law into being. For chemical regulation, Rachel Carson's work serves as a good
starting point. The novel and persuasive feature of Silent Spring was Carson's
use of science to demonstrate the extent of the problem of pesticides. 20 1 Since
then, we have relied on science to reveal problems, and science has become the
central justification for regulatory actions that are expensive or otherwise
unpopular.20 2
Perversely, in view of this history, the science-based approach in TSCA
has been used to justify aggressive interpretation of the evidentiary and
197. See THOMAS 0. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY
ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY (1991).
198. Id.
199. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 64.
200. REACH, supra note 45, at Preamble (102).
201. RACHEL CARSON, SILENT SPRING (1962).
202. See Wendy E. Wagner, The Science Charade in Toxic Risk Regulation, 95 COLUM. L. REV.
1613, 1651-1654 (1995) (suggesting that non-scientific considerations are often at work in regulatory
actions, despite the nominal reliance on scientific rationales).
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procedural requirements of the statute to advance an anti-regulatory agenda. In
the spirit of the "sound science" movement, opponents of regulation have
successfully demanded that regulatory action be withheld without clear, nearly
incontrovertible scientific demonstration of the nature and extent of
environmental harm.20 3 In Corrosion Proof Fittings, the case that brought non-
voluntary TSCA programs to a virtual standstill, the court was highly critical of
the quality and definitiveness of EPA's one hundred thousand-page scientific
record on the effects of asbestos. 20 4 In view of the findings and substantial
evidence provisions of TSCA, the record was deemed insufficient to support
the restrictions that EPA had imposed. 20
5
In REACH, the European Union responds to the debate over the role of
science. The precautionary principle, of course, seeks to avoid obstructionist
use of "sound science" by authorizing regulation in advance of certainty.
Indeed, the standard formulation of the principle is couched as a rhetorical
counter-move ("shall not be used as a reason"), 20 6 rather than an affirmative
substantive command. On the other hand, entities like the World Trade
Organization (WTO), with a greater stake in economic activity than in
environmental protection, insist that regulatory restrictions be based on
scientific information. 20 7 The European Commission, seeking to reconcile
European commitments to strong environmental protection and to free trade
under the auspices of the WTO, incorporates precaution into a science-based
risk assessment framework, and limits its use to the specific situation of
residual uncertainties. 20 8 While it adopts a reversed burden of proof and other
information-generating devices, REACH ultimately adopts a filling approach to
the data gap and requires a "sound scientific basis" for restrictions on
chemicals. 20
9
In all of these respects, REACH and TSCA bear important and
fundamental similarities in their approaches to chemicals regulation. Both
balance protection of human health and promotion of the chemical industry,
they regulate chemicals as such to supplement the media-based statutes, they
seek to prevent toxic harm before it occurs, they regulate on the basis of a risk
characterized by less-than-absolute safety and modified by cost and other non-
health considerations, they are information-intensive in that they aspire to fill
203. See Thomas 0. McGarity, Our Science is Sound Science and Their Science is Junk Science:
Science-Based Strategies for A voiding Accountability and Responsibility for Risk-Producing Products
and Activities, 52 KAN. L. REv. 897, 897-901,904-908 (2004).
204. Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1991).
205. Id.
206. Rio Declaration, supra note 127, at 15.
207. Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures, Final Act Embodying
the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, available at
http://www.wto.org/english/docs e/legal e/ 5-sps.pdf.
208. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 123, at 13-
15, 20-21.
209. REACH, supra note 45, at arts. 69-73; see also Commission Proposal, supra note 1, at 16, 37.
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the data gap (albeit in different ways), and each is committed to a
comprehensive, analytical approach to regulation.
B. Practical Principles for TSCA Reform
Taken together, the areas of commonality between TSCA and REACH,
the widely acknowledged failures of TSCA, and the regulatory innovations in
REACH, suggest four interrelated principles for improvement of chemicals
regulation:
1. Chemical regulation should be preventive and its restrictions
proportionate to the risk presented;
2. Chemical regulation should aim for progressive improvement in
chemical safety;
3. Regulation should be based on all currently available information, and
lack of full information should not be a barrier to regulatory action;
4. The regulatory process should be as transparent and as simple as
possible.
It bears emphasis that these principles are not necessarily the principles that one
would adopt if writing on a blank slate. They represent only a modest proposal
and not a paradigm shift in chemical regulation. Rather, the principles represent
a synthesis between the TSCA and REACH regulatory approaches; therefore,
they offer the best prospect of adoption when TSCA is revised in the near
future.
1. Prevention and Proportion
Much of the nominal approach of TSCA to prevention and proportion
would be retained as an effective way to regulate chemicals. Substantively,
chemicals regulation should be preventive and its restrictions proportionate to
the risk presented. Prevention of harm before it occurs is the principal
justification for governmental regulation of chemicals. It has both the
normative underpinning of preventing unconsented harm and the utilitarian
goal of cost-effective environmental management-prevention being cheaper
than repair. In an industrial society, perfect safety is an unattainable, if not
incoherent, goal; therefore, regulatory restrictions need to be related-though
not precisely calibrated-to the prospective harm. This principle suggests the
following corollaries:
Risk-based regulation. TSCA already establishes risk-based regulation
which incorporates both prevention and proportion. Risk-based regulation is
preventive, because it addresses probabilities of harm, rather than actual harm.
Risk-based regulation also facilitates proportionate responses, because risk can
be (and usually is) understood to be scaled rather than bi-modal, measured by
the likelihood of harm of a particular magnitude.
Chemical-based approach. For the reasons detailed above, regulating
chemicals as such-that is, at the beginning rather than the end of their life
2008]
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cycle-is widely acknowledged to be the most efficient and effective way to
achieve a preventive approach.
Cost-sensitive. Acceptance of a greater-than-zero residual risk from
chemicals, which risk and proportionality both imply,2 10 necessitates the
establishment of some criteria for determining the acceptable level of risk
between zero and one hundred percent. Both TSCA and REACH take cost into
account in making this determination. However, even in TSCA, where costs are
more heavily weighted and the burden of justification is placed on the agency,
cost does not necessarily determine outcomes. Moreover, neither demands a
formal, quantitative cost-benefit justification for regulatory action.2 11
Regulatory action should be sensitive to costs rather than determined by them.
Although TSCA is already grounded in these principles, reform should
permit such analysis to go forward on the basis of actually available
information. For example, the approach of Corrosion Proof Fittings, which
raised a nearly insurmountable evidentiary bar to substantial regulation, makes
a balancing analysis nearly impossible if estimates of risk are in effect not
permitted. 2 12 Ultimately, cost should be a boundary factor at the outer limits of
acceptable levels of risk. That is, it should function more like it does in a
feasibility analysis, to limit only the most damagingly expensive impositions.
2. Progressive Improvement
Chemical regulation should aim for progressive improvement in chemical
safety. Neither TSCA nor REACH adopts the goal of a chemical-free economy,
but rather the control of dangerous chemicals before they cause harm to human
health or the environment. "The European Union is aiming to achieve that, by
2020, chemicals are produced and used in ways that lead to minimization of
significant adverse effects on human health and the environment. '2 13 A
commitment to progressive improvement is, if not particularly encouraged by,
at least consistent with TSCA. For example, the ITC process was clearly
intended to identify the most problematic chemicals for further testing and
subsequent restriction. As Professor Driesen has argued, given the difficulty of
determining the precise costs and benefits of environmental harm, it makes
more sense to point potentially harmful activities in the right direction than to
try to define a static, optimal norm.2 14
210. Conversely, one could say that risk and proportionality reject the hazard model of a bi-modal
choice between safe and unsafe.
211. H.R. REP. No. 94-1679, at 9, 13-14 (1976) (stating that consideration of cost does not imply
"any cost-benefit justification").
212. See Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1229-30 (5th Cir. 1991).
213. REACH, supra note 45, at Preamble (4). REACH describes this objective as sustainable
development because it tries to bridge economic growth and environmental protection. See Commission
White Paper, supra note 1, at 4.
214. See generally DAVID M. DRIESEN, THE ECONOMIC DYNAMICS OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(2003).
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Identify and eliminate the worst chemicals. TSCA can especially benefit
from the incorporation of more sophisticated and robust priority-setting
mechanisms. Because regulatory resources are limited, the failure to establish
deliberate priorities among the thousands of chemicals in commerce paralyzes
regulatory action. The first step of progressive improvement, therefore, is to
take action against the chemicals whose release into the environment presents
irreversible harm because of their toxicity or persistence. So that priority setting
does not become an end in itself, priority setting based on proxies like
production volume, inherent characteristics, or persistence in the
environment-triage, in effect-is sensible, if not necessary. The Canadian
Environmental Protection Act is an excellent model. Focusing on relative rather
than absolute hazard, it has made tremendous progress in a relatively short
time.215
Learn how to live safely with what remains. The next step in progressively
preventing harm is to learn how to live safely with what remains. The "safety
case" is a familiar concept in Europe, but is seldom used in the United States. It
refers to a portfolio of information that characterizes a chemical and its uses,
and that demonstrates, using appropriate information and assumptions, how it
can be used safely through its life cycle. The chemical safety report required by
REACH 216 is essentially a safety case, especially since it includes appropriate
use restrictions, as well as risk information. While the safety case concept does
not presuppose any particular definition of what is acceptably safe, European
environmental policy requires a "high level of protection." 217 Although "high
level of protection" is a fair description of most U.S. statutory standards as
well, TSCA currently does a poor job of demonstrating comprehensive safety.
Reform of TSCA should provide some mechanism for developing substantitive
use requirements that would reduce the risks from use as much as is
practicable.
Strong incentives for finding safer substitutes. Innovation is essential to
the continued competitiveness of the chemical industry. By directing
innovation toward safer alternatives, an economically healthy chemical
industry can contribute importantly to safety. In addition to the techniques
deployed in REACH, a direct way to create this incentive is to require that the
justification for the use of a chemical include an analysis of the chemical in the
context of its substitutes and their respective life cycles. 218 The Massachusetts
215. Government of Canada, Chemicals Management Plan, http://www.chemicalsubstances
chimiques.gc.ca/plan/indexe.html (last visited Oct 16, 2008); see also DENISON, supra note 61, at 1-4-
5; Peter Menyasz, Canada Issues List of Priority Chemicals, Calls on Industry to Report Certain
Emissions, 31 INTL. ENVT. REP. (BNA) 203 (March 5, 2008) (describing progress to date and ongoing
efforts).
216. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 14.
217. Treaty of European Union, supra note 122, at 174(2).
218. Lars Koch & Nicholas A. Ashford, Rethinking the Role of Information in Chemicals Policy:
Implications for TSCA and REACH, 14 J. CLEANER PRODUCTION 31,37 (2006).
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Toxics Use Reduction Act, for example, requires the manufacturers and users
of toxic chemicals to generate use reduction plans. 219 While the plans need
neither be followed nor publicly disclosed, the investment in the development
of the plans is expected to encourage their implementation.
Alongside mechanisms for minimizing the risks from chemicals, TSCA
should require consideration of reductions in the volume of chemicals produced
and sold, in addition to restrictions on the permitted uses, to encourage the
search for substitutes. Both amounts and uses could be ratcheted down over
time.
Further progress. Such progressive incentives would also embody a
principle of requiring further progress toward safety as technology and
practices improve. The idea of progressive substitution of safer chemicals can
be extended to a continuing obligation to seize opportunities for greater
chemical safety. This is expressed, for example, in the limited lives of REACH
authorizations, 220 in contrast to TSCA, which does not require subsequent
reauthorization except for "new" uses. More importantly, it is expressed in the
REACH authorization requirement that "[n]otwithstanding any conditions of an
authorization, the holder shall ensure that the exposure is reduced to as low a
level as is technically and practically possible." 221 The Communication on the
Precautionary Principle also suggested an ALARA ("as low as reasonably
achievable") standard 222 as a way to deal with uncertainty. ALARA is not a
widely used concept in U.S. environmental law; however, it is a central-and
arguably quite successful---element of the somewhat esoteric area of nuclear
safety, 223 and it could be more widely deployed.
3. Precaution
TSCA and REACH clearly make the filling rather than the bridging choice
for chemical data, in that they require the systematic evaluation of chemicals on
a case-by-case basis. An inherently data-intensive and time-consuming
approach, it must be tempered with precaution to avoid regulatory paralysis in
the face of incomplete or uncertain information. Regulation should be based on
all actually available information, and the lack of full information should not
be a barrier to preventive action. As reformers of TSCA consider options, it is
critical that they not respond to the data gap by retreating from a protective
standard.
Consider all relevant, available information. Regulation should not be
based on deliberate ignorance, and regulators should be able to consider the
219. See supra note 135.
220. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 60(8)-(9).
221. Id. at art. 60(l 0).
222. Communication from the Commission on the Precautionary Principle, supra note 123, at 15.
223. United States Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Standards for Protection Against Radiation, 10
C.F.R. §§ 20.1003, 20.1101 (2008).
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range of relevant data, including scientific, technologic, economic, and social
information, in reaching decisions. However, consistent with precaution, some
points in the regulatory process (for example, data gathering) must be able to
proceed on the basis of limited data. TSCA reform should remove the current
incentives for ignorance.
Generate information for existing and new chemicals. The demand for and
supply of information is a central aspect of any chemical regulation scheme.
Having created a demand for information, a regulatory system needs to have
mechanisms in place to ensure that the information is supplied.224 As we have
seen, REACH-with the advantage of thirty additional years of experience
with chemical regulation in Europe and the U.S.-is more urgently focused on
information needs than TSCA was. In addition, to the extent that European
efforts to obtain reliable toxicological data without animal testing are
successful, they could result in a faster and cheaper regulatory process.
Whether TSCA reform requires manufacturers to supply such information or
authorizes and funds EPA to conduct the necessary research itself, TSCA must
provide more effective means for generating the needed information.
Follow a precautionary approach. One of the central realities of chemical
regulation is that the needed information is not now available, nor is it likely to
be available in the immediate future. Therefore, if TSCA is to be truly
preventive, TSCA reform must incorporate provisions that expressly permit
EPA to act in advance of full information. The provisions of REACH "are
underpinned by the precautionary principle" 225; it is a basic requirement of all
European environmental law, and the idea of precautionary action has a long
history in U.S. environmental law.226 For these purposes, the precautionary
principle is not (and was never intended to be) a rule that gives specific
direction in particular cases. It is, rather, a general statement of the relationship,
especially as regards timing, between the exercise of governmental regulatory
authority and available information. 227 As such, it is an essential baseline
element of an information-dependent regulatory system.
Iteration. Some more recent versions of the precautionary principle
require that decisions based on less than full information be revisited as more
information becomes available. This requirement is designed to reconcile
science-based regulation with preventive regulation, and the idea can be
broadened to encompass the obvious logic of revisiting prior decisions on the
basis of significant new information. Professor Doremus melds these aspects of
precaution with other recent scholarship on regulatory use of new information
to suggest that precaution works best in a regulatory system that is capable of
learning; that is, adjusting in response either to previously unknown or
224. See generally Applegate, Bridging the Data Gap, supra note 20.
225. REACH, supra note 45, at art. 1(3).
226. John S. Applegate, The Precautionary Preference: An American Perspective on the
Precautionary Principe, 6 HUM. & ECOLOGICAL RISK ASSESSMENT 413,420-29 (2000).
227. See Fisher, supra note 124, at 20-23.
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uncertain information, or to observation of the response to regulatory action.22 8
An iterative approach also supports progressive improvement of chemical
safety.
Taken together, the principles of precaution and iterative learning in the
regulatory scheme suggest a fundamental reworking of the structure of TSCA.
At least in the context of the registration of chemicals, provision should be
made for both initial restriction and periodic revisiting of registrations.
However, given the procedural bulkiness of TSCA, such intensive and repeated
efforts would be unworkable without making the regulatory apparatus of TSCA
far more nimble than it is today.
4. Transparency and Simplicity
Procedurally, the regulatory system should be transparent and simple, or at
least as simple as basic procedural fairness and informed deliberation allow.
Some of these considerations flow from the principles above, but they are also
grounded in a wider vision of participation and inclusion of the public that is
exposed to the harms that result from misuse of chemicals.
Provide the public with full chemical safety information. As we have seen,
providing the public with full information about chemical safety and
management permits individual decision making and collective (i.e., political or
legal) action. Transparency concerning relevant information is also essential to
meaningful public participation in the administrative process. The internet has
created the potential for widespread public access to chemical safety
information in a number of forms and at different levels of technical detail.
Regulatory systems should not only require the production of relevant
information, but also organize it and make it available in broadly usable
formats.
Limit procedural complexity. Procedural complexity works against the
general principles of a protective regulatory scheme. An iterative, learning
system that seeks progressive improvement of chemical safety needs to be
nimble in responding to new hazards and new information about existing areas
of concern. The informal rulemaking procedure in U.S. administrative law229
was designed to achieve this flexibility, but it has "ossified" over time,
becoming more rigid and complex. 230 TSCA is perhaps the ne plus ultra of
ossification. The extraordinary procedural elaboration deployed by TSCA
protects the no-regulation status quo, 23 1 but it also slows responses to any new
228. Holly Doremus, Precaution, Science, and Learning While Doing in Natural Resource
Management, 82 WASH. L. REV. 547 (2007).
229. Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 553 (2006).
230. Thomas 0. McGarity, Some Thoughts on "Deossifying" the Rulemaking Process, 41 DuKE
L.J. 1385, 1385-85 (1992) (quoting E. Donald Elliott).
231. Daniel B. Rodriquez & Barry R. Weingast, The Positive Political Theory of Legislative
History: New Perspectives on the 1964 Civil Rights Act and Its Interpretation, 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1417,
1444-45 (2003).
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information. Some procedural complexity is inevitable in achieving a truly
participatory system and, especially in the case of the EU, to recognizing the
relationship between the Union and its Member States. Nevertheless,
procedural elaboration, including aggressive judicial review, should be
avoided. Although in many instances regulatory actions may restrict chemical
use in the initial stages as currently unrestricted chemicals face precautionary
restrictions, with time the regulated industries would also benefit from rapid
relaxation of such restrictions should subsequent information suggest
restrictions are not necessary.
CONCLUSION: CHEMICAL REGULATION AND GLOBALIZATION
The premise of the comparative approach of this Article is that the
chemical regulation systems of the European Union and the United States are
well known to each other, that they have lessons for each other, and that they
have an impact on each other. Relationships between national legal systems are
not new, of course, but the intensity and practically instantaneous nature of
today's relationships are. In this sense, the relationship of TSCA and REACH
exemplifies the phenomenon of globalization. Globalization is distinct from the
traditional international legal order in that it involves transnational impacts in
informal, non-hierarchical ways. 232 International law in the strict sense of the
law of nations has very limited domestic application. With globalization, the
laws or norms of one state affect actors in other states, not necessarily directly,
but because many actors have a global existence (for example, multinational
corporations) and find it necessary or valuable to follow the laws of multiple
states. Pollution and products travel across borders, bringing their hazards with
them. Likewise, states in their domestic lawmaking react to each other through
direct observation and informal discussion, more than through formal
agreements in an overarching treaty.
Chemical manufacturing and distribution is truly a global industry.
Production is dominated by several multinational corporations, many of whose
names are familiar, with facilities and markets all over the world. Hundreds of
other companies export and import smaller amounts across the globe. For both
the United States and Europe, chemicals are major export products and include
substantial exports to each other.233 As a result, many chemical manufacturers
and distributors, especially the larger ones, are subject to both TSCA and
REACH. Efficiency, if nothing else, will demand that the chemical industry
adopt practices that comply with both systems. Professor Wirth calls this the
"California effect" (California is such a large market that its requirements often
232. Jost Delbrilck, Globalization of Law, Politics, and Markets-Implications for Domestic Law-
A European Perspective, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 9, 10-11 (1993).
233. Commission White Paper, supra note 1, at 4; see also American Chemistry Council, Did You
Know?, http://www.americanchemistry.com/s-acc/sec-didyouknow.asp?CID= 98&DID=524 (last
visited October 16, 2008).
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dictate behavior in other states) in his study of the impact that REACH has had
and will have on U.S. chemicals regulation.234
It is no surprise, therefore, that U.S. chemical manufacturers are looking
with great interest at REACH's demands. They will have to meet those
demands if they are to maintain and expand markets in Europe.235 The trade
press is full of advice in interviews, seminars, and papers, and the U.S.
Department of Commerce issues regular advisories and tutorials about
compliance. 236 Moreover, to implement REACH, U.S. manufacturers and
European regulators will undoubtedly (indeed, already do) rely heavily on data
generated for TSCA and other mandatory and voluntary U.S. programs, such as
the HPV Challenge. For its part, the European Chemicals Agency sees an
opportunity to create a global regulatory community. It already works closely
with U.S. and Canadian authorities, and it hopes to establish a 'world
standard' for chemicals assessment and management. 237
Even more fundamentally, the strong commitment to transparency in
REACH, with the internet as the preferred means of presenting that
information, will result in data generated on the east side of the Atlantic being
more or less instantly available on the west side (and anywhere else) to
virtually anyone who is interested. Indeed, the Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) has already created a website called
eChemPortal that "provides free public access to information on chemical
properties and direct links to collections of information prepared for
government chemical review programmes at national, regional, and
international levels."238 And this new knowledge, of course, will be the basis
for demands on regulators and other legal action on both sides of the Atlantic.
TSCA was proposed in 1971 and enacted in 1976. It has many strengths,
but it also suffers from serious flaws. It has been ill-used in many ways by the
courts and others, and it has devolved into little more than a forum for
voluntary programs. TSCA is overdue for reform. The REACH approach, on
234. David A. Wirth, The EU's New Impact on U.S. Environmental Regulation, 31:2 Fletcher
Forum of World Affairs 91, 100-106 (2007).
235. The US government and US industry conducted an unprecedented lobbying effort in Europe to
derail or weaken REACH as it was going through the legislative process. GREENPEACE, TOXIC LOBBY:
HOW THE CHEMICALS INDUSTRY is TRYING TO KILL REACH 16 (May 2006), available at
http://www.greenpeace.org/toxiclobby. See also SCHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra note 26, at 143-49.
See also FRANK ACKERMAN, POISONED FOR PENNIES: THE ECONOMICS OF TOXICS AND PRECAUTION
217-26 (2008) (describing the analysis that U.S. chemical companies will undertake in deciding whether
to continue to export to Europe).
236. See, e.g., U.S. Mission to the European Union, The Latest on REACH, http://
www.buyusa.gov/europeanunion/reach.html (last visited Nov. 29, 2008).
237. Stephen Gardner, New European Chemicals Head Outlines REACH Implementation
Priorities, 30 INTL. ENVT. REP. (BNA) 931 (Nov. 28, 2007). See also SCHAPIRO & GLICKSMAN, supra
note 26, at 156-58 (describing the pressure on U.S. chemical producers to conform to REACH).
238. Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, eChemPortal, The Global Portal
to Information of Chemical Substances, http://webnet3.oecd.org/echemportal/Contents.aspx?
ContentName=Portallnfo (last visited October 13, 2008).
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the other hand, was conceived in 2001 with the TSCA experience very much in
mind. And now, to complete the circle, TSCA is being reexamined by a newly
receptive Congress and President. It is hoped that Congress will look to
REACH for ideas, and that it can find in TSCA and REACH a synthesis of
general principles and specific techniques that will assist it promptly to revise
TSCA to be the effective protector of human health and the environment that
was envisioned over three decades ago.
We welcome responses to this Article. If you are Interested in submitting a response for our online
companion journal, Ecology Law Currents, please contact ecologylawcurrents@
boalt.org. Responses to articles may be viewed at our webslte, http://www.boalt.org/elq.
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